11.1 |
De-Ba’athification
124.
On 12
December, in a telegram to the FCO on strategy for engaging the
Sunni
community,
Mr David Richmond, now Deputy Special Representative on Iraq,
wrote that
it was
essential that:
“The
possibility of de‑Ba’athification … distinguish[ed] between
senior/criminal
elements
and those whose party affiliation was obligatory or nominal. The
CPA
almost
certainly made a mistake in handing this issue to the IGC. Most
IGC
members are
hard‑liners more interested in rooting out Ba’athists wherever
they
can be
found and excluding all former Ba’ath Party members from standing
for
elections
to the TNA [Transitional National Assembly] than in reconciliation.
Not all
Sunnis were
Ba’athists but this is bound to cause further alienation. I have
spoken
to Bremer
about this. He is ready to make clear to the IGC that sweeping
exclusions
are
unacceptable and that the economic and security consequences have
to be
125.
In January
2004, the GC published procedures for the implementation
of
de‑Ba’athification.113
They
confirmed that all individuals working in the public
sector
who fell
into the following categories were to be dismissed immediately if
they had not
already
been removed from office:
•
those in
the top four tiers of Ba’ath Party membership;114
and
•
those in
the top three tiers of public sector management qualifying as
member
or active
member (less senior Ba’athists).
126.
Those in the
top three tiers of Ba’ath Party membership would have no
opportunity
for appeal.
A formal appeal mechanism was put in place for:
•
those in
the fourth tier of Ba’ath Party membership; and
•
those in
the top three layers of public sector management who had not
been
senior
Ba’athists.
127.
Appeals were
to be held in two stages; first by local de‑Ba’athification
Review
Committees
(established by the relevant ministry, in each governorate area)
and then
by
Dr Chalabi’s Higher National de‑Ba’athification Commission.
Appeals could be either
on factual
grounds (for example, that the individual had been mistakenly
identified as
a senior
Ba’ath Party member but had not in fact been one), or on broader
grounds
regarding
the degree to which the individual subscribed to the ideals of the
former
regime. The
criteria against which commitment to the regime would be judged
were:
•
whether the
employee had renounced Ba’ath Party membership;
112
Telegram
306 IraqRep to FCO London, 12 December 2003, ‘Iraq: Sunni
Strategy’.
113
Talmon,
S. The
Occupation of Iraq: Volume II The Official Documents of the
Coalition Provisional
Authority and
the Iraqi Governing Council. Hart
Publishing, 2013.
114
Defined as
Udw Qutriyya (Regional Command Member), Udw Far (Branch Member),
Udw Shu’bah’
(Section
Member) and Udw Firqah (Group Member).
27