15.1 | Civilian
personnel
123.
Baroness Amos
made a number of broad recommendations for enhancing
the
UK contribution:
•
“more UK
people with political skills on the ground … Arabic speakers,
with
knowledge
of the region, to strengthen capacity in CPA(South) and
CPA
Baghdad”;
•
“strengthen
the senior management” in CPA(South) and “provide other
staff
as required”;
and
•
send
“whatever additional staff are required with the right skill set to
CPA
[in Baghdad]”.
124.
A week later,
Ms Hewitt advised Mr Blair of the need “to ensure that we
are
seconding
sufficiently senior people to the CPA”.82
It was
noticeable that the US was
sending
more senior people than the UK.
125.
Ms Keeble told
the Inquiry:
“… the
numbers speak for themselves. I think there were two advisers
embedded
with the
military, two others in Kuwait, one in Washington with ORHA, as it
was then,
one in
Amman, one in Tehran, for a large part of the early stages of the
action and,
by the time
I left DFID, I think there were – I think I’m right in saying about
nine in
Baghdad and
six in Basra and presumably still one in Washington.
“… I think
it is a matter of judgement as to whether that’s a large number or
not.
I didn’t
think it was a very large number.” 83
126.
Participants
at the Inquiry’s civilian outreach event who had served in Iraq in
2003
and 2004
commented on the additional responsibilities of Occupation. Many
felt that
Occupying
Power status changed the nature of their job from simply working
overseas
to carrying
an immense responsibility to Iraqis to do what was needed to get
Iraq
functioning.
Many struggled to find defined roles and hold on to them in
US‑dominated
Iraqi
ministries. They commented that it was often difficult to influence
the US because
of the UK’s
relative size and capacity.
127.
The skills and
seniority of civilian staff deployed to Iraq are considered later
in
this
Section.
128.
By June 2003,
the security of civilian personnel in Iraq had become a
major
concern.
129.
In Cabinet on
19 June, Baroness Amos said that the uncertain security situation
in
Iraq
required the UK to keep the security of the people it deployed
there under review.84
82
Letter
Hewitt to Prime Minister, 11 July 2003, ‘Report of My Visit to
Baghdad’.
83
Public
hearing, 5 July 2010, page 27.
84
Cabinet
Conclusions, 19 June 2003.
265