2 |
Decision-making within government
the
Secretariat, then over a period of time it is likely that there
will be an implicit
assumption
that the Cabinet Secretary’s interests are being represented… so
you
don’t
really need to invite the Cabinet Secretary to the
meeting.”
49.
Asked whether
that had affected decision-making on Iraq, Sir David
Omand
responded
that:
“I think
the Cabinet Secretary was not as present as previous Cabinet
Secretaries …
would have
been. Of course one of the reasons for that is that the Prime
Minister
had given
the Cabinet Secretary a very different agenda … the new
Cabinet
Secretary
was chosen explicitly on that basis.”
50.
Sir David
agreed that the Cabinet Secretary could have “made a fuss” about
that:
“But it
would have been at the direct expense of not being able to devote
the time
to sorting
out reform and delivery across the government’s agenda.”
29
51.
Describing the
resource constraints in the Cabinet Office, Sir David Omand told
the
Inquiry
that he had “inherited an overspend where there wasn’t enough money
to pay
for all”
the units in Downing Street and the Cabinet Office, which were
“funded from the
same
vote”.30
The
Treasury had kept them, he expected “deliberately”, on a “very
tight
leash in
order to restrain the growth of Downing Street”. Sir David had
found it “quite
hard” to
staff the Cabinet Office at the level he would have wanted and it
had been
necessary
to prioritise.
52.
In relation to
Iraq, Sir David said:
“We did
find money for OD Secretariat to expand… at the time of Iraq. We
did find
money to
enable the Joint Intelligence Committee’s assessment staff to work
at full
tilt as the
crisis – the run up to the campaign – developed.
“But it was
a bit of a struggle and not necessarily ideal. It was also the case
that
the
Overseas and Defence Secretariat, who were hard pressed on Iraq,
were also
valiantly
providing me the sole support I had to work on a counter-terrorism
strategy.
I have
nothing but praise for them. They did a fantastic job, but it was a
stretch.”
“In a
sense, one of the lessons … is that you can’t enter into a run-up
to a major
conflict
and continue with business as usual. There was a certain sense that
the
government
was trying to do everything as well as manage this very major
military
operation –
I don’t think that’s possible.
29
Public
hearing, 20 January 2010, pages 53-54.
30
Public
hearing, 20 January 2010, pages 6-7.
275