6.3 |
Military equipment (pre-conflict)
and deployment
points. Lt Gen Pigott suggested that this could lead to “a
note to the
Prime
Minister setting out these and the financial implications of taking
contingency
action
now”.
84.
General Sir
Michael Walker was Chief of the General Staff (CGS) from 2000
to
February
2003. His Private Office wrote to the Chiefs of Staff Secretariat
on 13 June,
referring
to the 9 May advice on equipment lead times.39
He stated
that the advice
highlighted
“just a few of several areas where key deficiencies exist” if a
medium or large
scale
operation were to be undertaken. Other areas included battlefield
helicopters,
the issue
of stocks and the supply of items such as ammunition. Gen Walker
would
elaborate
on these other areas at the Chiefs of Staff meeting on
18 June.40
85.
The minutes
from the weekly Chiefs of Staff meeting do not record any
reference
to a
discussion on equipment planning for Iraq.41
86.
As work on
military options in the MOD progressed, it was recognised
that,
if a
large scale option was pursued, not all of the essential UOR
equipment
required
for operations in the Gulf could be procured and fitted within six
months.
87.
A paper
produced by the SPG on 24 May, ‘Contingency Thinking: Force
Generation
and
Deployment for the Gulf’, was sent to the Chiefs of Staff and a
limited number of
88.
The SPG
identified a number of key assumptions that included:
•
Operations
would not commence before autumn 2002.
•
Decisions
would not be taken incrementally because that would “add to
timelines
by making
force generation increasingly complex and costly”.
•
Enhancements
would be needed to enable units to operate in the Gulf.
That
would
expose preparations from an early stage given the significant
number of
contracts
that would be required with industry.
89.
Three broad
levels of effort in line with the MOD’s planning assumptions
were
examined:
•
the maximum
the UK could provide (a large scale contribution);
•
a
“credible” medium scale package; and
•
a small
scale package.
90.
Reflecting the
UK’s existing military commitments and the most recent
MOD
budgetary
planning round, the SPG advised that the UK could realistically
produce a
39
Note
MA1/CGS to COSSEC, 13 June 2002, ‘Iraq – Equipment Lead
Times’.
40
It is
believed that Gen Walker’s Office was referring to the Think Tank
discussion on 18 June referred
to later
in this Section, for which there was no record.
41
Minutes,
18 June 2002, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
42
Paper SPG,
24 May 2002, ‘Contingency Thinking: Force Generation and
Deployment for the Gulf’.
15