The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
578.
The Iraqi
Governing Council met for the first time on 13 July (see Section
9.2). The
CPA and the
Governing Council agreed that the CPA would be “required to
consult” the
Governing
Council on “all major decisions and questions of
policy”.
579.
Mr Blair
visited Washington on 17 July.318
Mr Blair
urged President Bush to focus
on a media
strategy for communicating with the Iraqi people, to ensure they
understood
that the US
and UK were there to help and were improving basic services. It was
those
opposed to
Coalition Forces who were responsible for the power shortages.
Mr Blair
proposed
that UK and US media professionals should work out a media plan. If
more
resources
were needed, they should be made available.
580.
Mr Blair
said that if security could be improved, the pace of
reconstruction
could
quicken.
581.
The Annotated
Agenda for the 17 July meeting of the AHMGIR advised
that
the CPA’s
‘Vision for Iraq’ had been finalised.319
Although
not perfect, it met the UK’s
(unspecified)
“basic requirements”.
582.
Hard
Lessons recorded that
senior Pentagon officials had approved the CPA’s
‘Vision for
Iraq’, which had been drafted by the CPA’s Office of Strategic
Planning, on
583.
The ‘Vision
for Iraq’ was underpinned by an implementation plan, ‘Achieving
the
Vision to
Restore Full Sovereignty to the Iraqi People’, which was circulated
to members
of Congress
on 23 July.321
584.
‘Achieving the
Vision’ defined the CPA’s “primary goal” as:
“… a
unified and stable, democratic Iraq that provides effective
and
representative
government for the Iraqi people; is underpinned by new
and
protected
freedoms and a growing market economy; is able to defend
itself
but no
longer poses a threat to its neighbours or international
security.”322
585.
It defined
four “principal objectives or ‘core foundations’”:
“•
security –
establishing a secure and safe environment;
•
essential
services – restoring essential services to an acceptable
standard;
•
economy –
creating the conditions for economic growth;
•
governance
…”
318
Letter
Rycroft to Adams, 18 July 2003, ‘Prime Minister’s Visit to
Washington, 17 July’.
319 Annotated
Agenda, 16 July 2003, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation
meeting.
320
Bowen SW
Jr. Hard
Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience. U.S.
Government Printing
Office,
2009.
321
Bremer LP
III & McConnell M. My Year in
Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope.
Threshold,
2006.
322
Paper CPA,
21 July 2003, ‘Achieving the Vision to Restore Full Sovereignty to
the Iraqi People’.
102