The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
regime‑threatening
retaliation from the coalition. Hence the use of WMD will
be
linked to
perception of regime survivability. Were the regime in danger of
imminent
collapse,
Saddam might consider use of WMD against internal opposition, US
forces
or
Israel.”
223.
The paper was
sent to Mr Hoon, the Chiefs of Staff, Sir Kevin Tebbit,
MOD
Permanent
Under Secretary (PUS), Mr Webb, Lieutenant General Sir Anthony
Pigott,
Deputy Chief
of the Defence Staff (Commitments), and a small number of
other
individuals.
It was also sent to Mr Scarlett and the Assessments Staff,
Mr Tom Dodd,
OD Sec,
Ms Amanda Tanfield, Head of the Iraq Section in the FCO Middle
East
Department,
and SIS.
224.
The paper was
subsequently included in the pack of reading material on Iraq
for
Mr Blair,
which was sent to No.10 by Mr Scarlett on 1 August (see
Section 3.4).
225.
From late
February 2002, Mr Blair and Mr Straw began publicly to
argue that
Iraq was a
threat which had to be dealt with.
226.
In a
memorandum to the Foreign Affairs Committee (FAC) in June 2003,
the
FCO stated:
“In the
early months of 2002, British Government statements underlined the
singular
threat
posed by Iraq’s behaviour.”107
227.
Before the
Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Australia,
Mr Blair
gave an
interview to the Australian
Broadcasting Corporation on 28
February in which
he stated
that he agreed with President Bush “very strongly that weapons of
mass
destruction
represent a real threat to world stability”; and that: “Those who
are engaged
in
spreading weapons of mass destruction are engaged in an evil trade
and it is
important
that we make sure that we have taken action in respect of
it.”108
228.
Mr Blair
also stated that: “The accumulation of weapons of mass destruction
by
Iraq poses
a threat, not just to the region but to the wider world.” President
Bush was
“absolutely
right to raise it”.
229.
On 3 March,
Mr Blair was reported to have told Channel
Nine in Australia
that:
“We know
they [Iraq] are trying to accumulate … weapons of mass
destruction,
we know
he’s prepared to use them. So this is a real issue but how we deal
with it,
that’s a
matter we must discuss.”109
107
Memorandum
FCO to Foreign Affairs Committee, 19 June 2003, ‘Further memorandum
from the
Foreign and
Commonwealth Office – Building a case against Iraq’.
108
BBC
News, 28 February
2002, Blair hints
at Iraq action.
109
BBC
News, 3 March
2002, Blair gives
Iraq new warning.
54