9.2 | 23
May 2003 to June 2004
“… ready to
continue to undertake a broad range of tasks to contribute to
the
maintenance
of security and to ensure force protection. These include
activities
necessary
to counter ongoing security threats posed by forces seeking to
influence
Iraq’s
political future through violence … including combat operations
against
members of
these groups, internment where this is necessary for imperative
reasons
of
security, and the continued search for and securing of weapons that
threaten
Iraq’s
security.”
1090.
Reflecting on
the resolution in a working breakfast with President Bush on 9
June,
Mr Blair
welcomed its unanimous adoption and proposed that the next step
should be
“to sort
out the Iraqiisation of security forces”.621
He
recognised that would be a “huge
task” given
the number of weapons in Iraq, and hoped that Prime Minister Allawi
and
Lt Gen
Petraeus would agree and publish a detailed plan.
1091.
Mr Hoon
discussed the US request for additional UK troops with Lt Gen
McColl,
during a
visit to Iraq on 14 June.622
Lt Gen
McColl’s view was that:
“… the UK
should deploy HQ ARRC and a further brigade to support the US
who
in his view
were ‘suffering’. General Abizaid had commented recently that he
had
already
asked for HQ ARRC six times.”
1092.
Asked by
Mr Hoon what difference that additional deployment would
make,
Lt Gen
McColl commented:
“… a UK
deployment would allow us to conduct operations in MND(CS) from a
UK
perspective.
“… if we
did not deploy additional troops there would be a higher level of
risk to
troops in
Iraq and a further risk to the strategic mission.”
He added
that:
“… the
issue of increasing UK influence on the US was becoming
‘embarrassing’.
The
positions that the UK held in various HQs (and hence the influence)
was
disproportionate
to our overall troop deployment and financial
contributions.”
1093.
On 14 June,
the Cabinet Office circulated a discussion paper as background
for
the next
Ministerial meeting on the US request to deploy additional
troops.623
This set
out
the
advantages and disadvantages of three options:
•
no
expansion;
621
Letter
Rycroft to Adams, 9 June 2004, ‘Prime Minister’s meeting with
President Bush 9 June 2004: Iraq
and
European Issues’.
622
Letter
Naworynsky to Owen, 17 June 2004, ‘Meeting between the Secretary of
State for Defence and
Senior
British Military Representative – Iraq: 14 June
2004’.
623
Minute
Cabinet Office [junior official] to Owen, 14 June 2004, ‘Iraq: the
context for an extension of
military
forces’ attaching Paper Cabinet Office, 11 June 2004, ‘Iraq: The
Context for an Expansion of
Military
Forces’.
387