The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
imposed by
these uncertainties, we have been considering the contribution we
might
be able to
make if military action ultimately becomes necessary.
“At this
stage it would be inappropriate to go into details of the size and
shape of
forces that
might be involved, for two specific reasons. First, as events
unfold and
time
passes, plans will inevitably evolve. It would be misleading to
describe specific
force
packages today as if they had some permanent and definitive
status …
Secondly,
as I am sure the House appreciates, I have no intention of
assisting
Saddam
Hussein’s contingency planning.”
171.
The Liberal
Democrat amendment was defeated by 452 votes to 85.
172.
The
question of who would be responsible for interpreting whether there
had
been a
material breach was also raised by Baroness Williams of Crosby in
an Oral
Question in
the House of Lords.
173.
In response to
an Oral Question from Baroness Williams of Crosby,
Baroness
Symons of
Vernham Dean, the joint FCO/Department of Trade and Industry
(DTI)
Minister
for Trade and Investment, stated on 25 November that she could
not:
“… give an
exhaustive list of what amounts to a material breach. It would be
a
question of
judgement at the time … it might be referred by the inspectorate
…
it might be
referred by a member of the … Security Council. There would be
an
immediate
meeting, when no doubt there would be a discussion about how
serious
174.
In response to
a question from Lord Howell of Guildford, about whether a
further
resolution
would be required before the UK could “go to war”, Baroness
Symons
responded
that resolution 1441 did:
“… not
stipulate that there has to be a second Security Council resolution
to
authorise
military action. Such a stipulation was never tabled … the
preference
of the
British Government in the event of a material breach is that there
should
be a second
resolution. But we are not about rewriting UNSCR 1441. It says
what
it says,
and it does not say that such a second resolution would be
necessary.”
175.
In Cabinet on
28 November, Mr Straw described the vote in the House
of
Commons on
25 November as an “overwhelming endorsement of the
Government’s
strategy
towards Iraq”.55
The next
deadline for Iraq was the requirement for a full
declaration
of their weapons of mass destruction programmes by 8
December.
54
House of
Lords, Official
Report, 25
November 2002, columns 557‑560.
55
Cabinet
Conclusions, 28 November 2002.
34