3.2 |
Development of UK strategy and options, January to April 2002 –
“axis of evil” to Crawford
part of the
conversation had been about his view that “dealing with the various
different
dimensions”
of the “whole issue … to do with unrepresentative extremism within
Islam in
a different
way”. He “wanted to persuade President Bush, but also get a sense
from him
where he
was on that broader issue”.283
“The only
commitment I gave, and I gave this very openly, at the meeting was
a
commitment
to deal with Saddam.” 284
719.
Asked whether
he and President Bush were agreed on the ends but not
the
means, Mr
Blair replied:
“We were
agreed on both … we were agreed that we had to confront this issue,
that
Saddam had
to come back into compliance with the international community, and
…
the method
is open …
“… one
major part of what President Bush was saying to me was just to
express his
fear … that
if we weren’t prepared to act in a really strong way, then we ran
the risk
of sending
a disastrous signal to the world.” 285
720.
Mr Blair told
the Inquiry that he could not “explain how people have come to
the
view that
there was some different commitment given”. What he had said to
President
Bush was
“we are going to be with you in confronting and dealing with this
threat”, as
he had
said at the subsequent press conference.286
721.
Asked what
conclusions President Bush would have taken from the meeting
about
his
commitment to deal with Saddam Hussein through military action, Mr
Blair replied:
“I think he
took … exactly what he should have taken, which is that, if it came
to
military
action because there was no way of dealing with this
diplomatically, we
would be
with him … because, as I had set out publicly … we had to
confront
this issue,
it could be confronted by a sanctions framework that was effective
…
we didn’t
have one. It could be confronted by a UN inspections framework …
or,
alternatively,
it would have to be confronted by force … We had been through
this
with Saddam
several times … the fact is that force was always an option.
What
changed
after September 11 was this, if necessary, and there was no other
way of
dealing
with this threat, we were going to remove him.”287
283
Public
hearing, 29 January 2010, pages 40-41.
284
Public
hearing, 29 January 2010, page 42.
285
Public
hearing, 29 January 2010, pages 42-43.
286
Public
hearing, 29 January 2010, pages 43-44.
287
Public
hearing, 29 January 2010, pages 47-48.
519