10.2  |  Reconstruction: July 2004 to July 2009

520.  The Embassy commented that on both security and electricity, the plan adopted

a “Baghdad-first” approach (Baghdad had a third of the country’s population and was

suffering more than other areas).

521.  The Embassy reported that the Iraqi Government had discussed the 100-day plan

with the British and US Embassies. As a result of those discussions, the Minister of

Planning had agreed:

• a UK recommendation to include Iraqi signature to the Extractive Industries

Transparency Initiative (EITI) in the plan; and

• to “play up” the monetarisation of the food subsidy, bank restructuring and civil

service reform as priorities for the new Government.

522.  Sir Nigel Sheinwald met Mr Maliki in Baghdad on 24 April.300 Mr Maliki said that his

priorities were security, the economy and services. There would have to be the toughest

possible penalties for corruption.

523.  Sir Nigel said that the UK’s ability to help with reconstruction in Basra was

hampered by the security situation. Mr Maliki said that he knew little of the detail of the

situation in Basra, but had heard that the population felt the UK had achieved very little

for them, even before security deteriorated. He advocated patience, waiting for local

elections that might bring change, and doing what the UK could to improve the economy.

Employment would reduce the security threat.

524.  Sir Nigel’s report of his visit to Mr Blair focused on government formation (see

Section 9.4).301 Sir Nigel confirmed that, as Mr Blair had suggested, the UK and US

had offered to help Mr Maliki establish his Government. The UK’s main contributions

would be:

• two officials (one FCO, one DFID) in the British Embassy working on the

substance of the Iraqi Government’s programme;

• one official to advise the British Ambassador and the Iraqi Government on media

and political strategy;

• No.10, FCO and MOD press officers to help with communications in key

ministries;

• three Adam Smith Institute Ltd consultants to advise on the structure and

operation of the Prime Minister’s Office and other key institutions; and

• a substantial MOD advisory team for the new Defence Minister.

525.  Mr Blair commented: “[W]e must make sure this team is strong enough.” 302

300  Telegram 13126/06 Baghdad to FCO London, 24 April 2006, ‘Iraq: Government Formation:

Maliki’s Views’.

301  Minute Sheinwald to Prime Minister, 27 April 2006, ‘Visit to Iraq’.

302  Manuscript comment Blair to Sheinwald on Minute Sheinwald to Prime Minister, 27 April 2006,

‘Visit to Iraq’.

283