The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
831.
The IPU saw no
reason for a radical overhaul of an industry which was
“relatively
well run
given the circumstances”. The US had identified individuals in Iraq
and the
diaspora
who could take on key roles. The UK should do the same. “Winning
hearts and
minds”
among oil workers and making sure they were paid would be vital.
The UK would
want to be
seen to help get oil pumping while putting out “robust messages”
that it had
no selfish
interest in doing so.
832.
Four types of
oil contract needed to be considered: OFF oil purchase
contracts,
which
should continue with minimal disruption; and new contracts for
tackling fires,
investment
in new fields and rehabilitation of infrastructure, all of which
would need to
be
transparent and open to UK firms. It was important to make sure the
US kept the UK
Government
in the picture.
833.
As next steps,
the IPU recommended the UK should:
•
convene a
meeting with UK oil companies to make use of their
expertise;
•
obtain the
US data on the Iraqi oil sector, including personnel;
•
carry out
detailed research on key oil infrastructure in the UK
sector;
•
hold
preliminary discussions with UK firms to ensure they were well
placed to
pick up
contracts;
•
develop an
oil sector information campaign;
•
calculate
the cost of paying Iraqi oil workers;
•
factor
rapid assistance for oil field installations into UK military
planning;
•
start work
on appropriate UN resolutions, including for the continuation of
the
OFF
programme; and
•
research
existing oil investment agreements with Iraq.
834.
On 2 March,
Mr Straw had commented: “V[ery] good paper.”351
835.
UK policy on
the management of Iraq’s oil reserves is addressed in Section
10.3.
836.
The last paper
in the set shown to Mr Blair, on economic actions in the first
30 to
60 days,
had been written in mid-February as the UK contribution to the
trilateral working
group on
economic issues.352
837.
The paper did
not allocate responsibility for individual post-conflict tasks or
identify
the likely
resources needed, but is the most detailed piece of non-military
planning for
post-conflict
Iraq seen by the Inquiry.353
351
Manuscript
comment Straw, 2 March 2003, on Minute Chilcott to Private
Secretary [FCO],
28 February 2003,
‘Iraq Day After – Oil Policy’.
352
Minute Dodd
to Manning, 3 March 2003, ‘Ad Hoc Group on Iraq’.
353
Paper
[unattributed], 14 February 2003, ‘Iraq Day After: Preliminary UK
Views on Economic Actions in
First 30/60
Days’.
462