6.3 |
Military equipment (pre-conflict)
470.
On deployment
processes, Lt Gen Reith wrote that it “went well” but “we
should
caution
against too much reliance on chartered air and shipping assets”. He
stated:
“There were
considerable challenges in tracking equipment, UORs, and
stores
particularly
in theatre, because of inadequacies in the management of the
deployed
inventory
systems, especially an ‘end to end’ tracking capability. This is an
old
chestnut
which requires addressing urgently.”
471.
Lt Gen
Reith continued:
“Stockholdings
were inadequate for this scale of operation.
Understandably
Ministers
will be reluctant to commit to operations until very late in the
day, which
means we
cannot approach industry early and we will also often be required
to do
more than
envisaged in defence planning assumptions. Thus, the policy of
‘just
enough just
in time’ needs urgent review.”
472.
Brigadier
Shaun Cowlam, Commander of 102 Logistics Brigade, wrote in his
post
operational
report in May 2003 that:
“Despite
the success in getting the force into theatre in half the time
taken for
Op GRANBY,
it was clear that poor personnel and equipment readiness across
the
force added
significantly to both logistic and, subsequently, operational risk.
Many
personnel
(particularly augmentees and Reservists) were poorly equipped
and
briefed for
deployment, some arriving in theatre with no combat clothing,
respirators,
weapons or
sleeping systems, and others not knowing which unit or location
they
were
destined for … The lesson is that units should be equipped on
deployment
to the
necessary scales. The argument that in many cases, broken readiness
and
preparation
times explain the shortcomings, ignores the reality that
readiness
is simply
an assumption. Op TELIC has shown that our current
assumptions
do not
reflect operational reality and we are taking unseen risks that we
are
473.
On
27 May, ACM Bagnall advised Lord Bach that he was “keen to
establish the
facts
(rather than early anecdotal views) relating to UORs and equipment
issues”.230
He wrote:
“Work on
the lessons is well underway and I have taken steps to ensure that
specific
issues
relating to UORs and equipment matters are properly captured. For
now it
is clear
that the tight timeline from the decision to activate the UOR
process; the
need to
properly balance the logistic push from the UK versus the
Commander’s pull
requirement
in theatre; asset tracking … will all feature prominently
…”
229
Report
Cowlam, 12 May 2003, ‘Operation TELIC – Joint Force Logistic
Component (JFLOGC)
Jan – May
2003 Post Operation Report’.
230
Minute VCDS
to PS/Minister(DP), 27 May 2003 ‘Iraq – Operation TELIC
Equipment
Performance/UORs’.
75