9.3 |
July 2004 to May 2005
297.
Mosul,
situated in MND(NE), was reported to be “increasingly in the grip
of
intimidation”
and was “increasingly being seen in MNF-I and IIG circles as ‘the
operation
after
next’”. Lt Gen Kiszely considered that:
“…
intimidation in Mosul is a microcosm of much of Iraq, especially
the Sunni areas.
It is my
perception that this widespread intimidation is deepening … The
number of
kidnaps, in
particular, is increasing, with the victims including the close
relatives of
senior
Ministers, Generals, Provincial Governors and Police
Chiefs.
“The level
of intimidation is severely undermining the rule of law … Criminals
and
insurgents
operate with impunity and rule by intimidation. The police are
either
driven out,
cowed, or are actively collaborating with the criminals and
insurgents.
This is
true in many areas designated by MNF-I as ‘at or near Local
Control’. Since
Local
Control is defined only in terms of internal security, and not in
terms of the rule
of law, it
is perfectly possible for areas to appear controlled – a relative
absence of
acts of
insurgency; some uniformed police on the streets by day – although
in reality
this is a
façade. It is actually the insurgents who are in
control.”
298.
Lt Gen Kiszely
advised “we shall need to watch this very carefully when
proposals
are made in
the up-coming Force Posture Review” because a premature move to
the
wrong
structure would be “likely to result in a loss of the gains we have
made and
a regression
in the counter-insurgency campaign”.
299.
On election
preparations, Lt Gen Kiszely reported:” The distribution of
voter
registration
material is almost complete, and in time for the start of
registration in the
coming
week.” He considered that timing was “at-risk to unforeseen
circumstances”.
Some
concerns remained about election security, but responsibility was
clearly with the
Iraqi
police. The MNF-I would “appear at or near election facilities only
in extremis”.
On 29
October, The
Lancet published
the results of a survey which compared mortality
rates in
Iraq before and after the invasion.153
The authors
concluded:
“… the
death toll associated with the invasion and occupation of Iraq is
probably
about
100,000 people, and may be much higher.”
The
study
stated that violence accounted for most of the excess deaths, that
violent
deaths were
“mainly attributed” to coalition forces, and that most individuals
reportedly
killed by
coalition forces were women and children.
There had
also been an increase in the infant mortality rate based on the
households
interviewed
for the study, from 29 deaths per 1,000 live births to 57 deaths
per 1,000 live
births.
Causes of death had also changed:
153
Roberts, L,
Lafta, R, Garfield, R, Khudhairi, J and Burnham, G. Mortality
before and after the 2003
invasion of
Iraq: cluster sample survey. The
Lancet 364:
1857-1864 (2004).
443