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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
Moreover, some incidents of non‑compliance may be susceptible to remedial action
by UNMOVIC/IAEA (e.g. by destroying weapons etc). In such cases, those seeking
to trigger enforcement action would need to explain how such action would be
necessary to enforce Iraqi compliance.”
225.  When Dr Blix briefed members of the Security Council on 6 December, the Council
decided to make UNMOVIC “the depository of the declaration” and asked UNMOVIC
and the IAEA to “review it immediately, with their experts and from the standpoint of
existing international treaties, for any areas in the declaration that may contribute to
proliferation, or be sensitive, in order to assure confidentiality of that information”.69
Members of the Council would meet the following week to decide on the further handling
of the declaration. The declaration would “not be available for some days until this
procedure is carried out and mechanical/logistical arrangements are made”.
JIC Assessment, 6 December 2002: ‘Iraq: Military Options’
226.  A JIC assessment of Iraq’s military options on 6 December confirmed that
a massive ground force would be required to be certain of toppling Saddam
Hussein and highlighted the possibility of Iraqi attacks on Coalition Forces.
227.  At the request of the MOD, the JIC evaluated Iraq’s military capabilities and its
military options and issued an Assessment on 6 December.70
228.  In the JIC discussion on 4 December, the draft Assessment was described as
“an important paper which highlighted the gaps in our knowledge”.71 The judgements
were based “largely on a mixture of observation and past experience”, but the draft
Assessment “did not quite do justice to the intelligence”; the judgements “could be
made more confidently”. The Assessment needed to bring out more clearly the risks of
a phased attack and unpack the risks involved in possible scenarios, such as the use
of CBW before Coalition Forces were properly assembled and urban fighting: “Nothing
short of a massive deployment would guarantee overthrowing the regime.”
229.  The JIC’s Key Judgements included:
Saddam Hussein would “initially seek international pressure to halt Coalition
[military] action”. If that failed, he would “seek to inflict serious casualties on
Iraq’s neighbours and on Coalition Forces”.
A ground attack might fracture Saddam’s regime, but only a massive Coalition
force was guaranteed to topple him. The smaller the initial Coalition force, the
more likely Iraqi forces were to resist. A phased Coalition attack could allow Iraq
to claim military successes.
69  UN Press Release, 10 December 2002, December 6 Press Statement by Security Council President on
Briefing of Council Members by Dr Blix (SC/7594).
70  JIC Assessment, 6 December 2002, ‘Iraq: Military Options’.
71  Minutes, 4 December 2002, JIC meeting.
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