The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
Moreover,
some incidents of non‑compliance may be susceptible to remedial
action
by
UNMOVIC/IAEA (e.g. by destroying weapons etc). In such cases, those
seeking
to trigger
enforcement action would need to explain how such action would
be
necessary
to enforce Iraqi compliance.”
225.
When
Dr Blix briefed members of the Security Council on 6 December,
the Council
decided to
make UNMOVIC “the depository of the declaration” and asked
UNMOVIC
and the
IAEA to “review it immediately, with their experts and from the
standpoint of
existing
international treaties, for any areas in the declaration that may
contribute to
proliferation,
or be sensitive, in order to assure confidentiality of that
information”.69
Members of
the Council would meet the following week to decide on the further
handling
of the
declaration. The declaration would “not be available for some days
until this
procedure
is carried out and mechanical/logistical arrangements are
made”.
226.
A JIC
assessment of Iraq’s military options on 6 December confirmed
that
a massive
ground force would be required to be certain of toppling
Saddam
Hussein and
highlighted the possibility of Iraqi attacks on Coalition
Forces.
227.
At the request
of the MOD, the JIC evaluated Iraq’s military capabilities and
its
military
options and issued an Assessment on 6 December.70
228.
In the JIC
discussion on 4 December, the draft Assessment was described
as
“an
important paper which highlighted the gaps in our
knowledge”.71
The
judgements
were based
“largely on a mixture of observation and past experience”, but the
draft
Assessment
“did not quite do justice to the intelligence”; the judgements
“could be
made more
confidently”. The Assessment needed to bring out more clearly the
risks of
a phased
attack and unpack the risks involved in possible scenarios, such as
the use
of CBW
before Coalition Forces were properly assembled and urban fighting:
“Nothing
short of a
massive deployment would guarantee overthrowing the
regime.”
229.
The JIC’s Key
Judgements included:
•
Saddam
Hussein would “initially seek international pressure to halt
Coalition
[military]
action”. If that failed, he would “seek to inflict serious
casualties on
Iraq’s
neighbours and on Coalition Forces”.
•
A ground
attack might fracture Saddam’s regime, but only a massive
Coalition
force was
guaranteed to topple him. The smaller the initial Coalition force,
the
more likely
Iraqi forces were to resist. A phased Coalition attack could allow
Iraq
to claim
military successes.
69
UN Press
Release, 10 December 2002, December 6
Press Statement by Security Council President on
Briefing of
Council Members by Dr Blix (SC/7594).
70
JIC
Assessment, 6 December 2002, ‘Iraq: Military Options’.
71
Minutes, 4
December 2002, JIC meeting.
42