The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
66.
In relation to
Iraq’s WMD programmes and the return of inspectors,
the
Assessment stated:
•
Saddam
Hussein’s “overriding priority” was “regime survival” and “he also
had
a very
strong commitment to retaining WMD” which he saw as “key to
Iraqi
power and
influence”. Iraq had “no credible alternative to ostensible
co-operation
with the
UN”.
•
The JIC had
“no new intelligence” on whether Iraq would “declare
any
prohibited
materials or activity in response” to resolution 1441. Any
disclosures
on WMD
would “damage the regime’s already limited credibility, given
its
continuing
blanket denials of WMD possession”. The Iraqi regime would
“seek
to take
advantage of any opportunity to fudge Iraq’s obligations or delay
the
UN process”.
•
Senior
Iraqis agreed “that Iraq should maintain a WMD capability”, but
if
UNMOVIC
made “demonstrable progress which threatens to overcome
Iraq’s
policy of
deception and concealment, and Saddam refuses to give ground,
there
could be
pressure on key insiders to break with Saddam in order to ensure
their
own
survival”.
67.
Mr John
Scarlett, Chairman of the JIC, wrote to No.10 on 21 November
to
highlight
new intelligence on Iraq’s thinking on managing UNMOVIC which
he
considered
“confirmed” earlier JIC judgements.
68.
Mr Scarlett
concluded that the Iraqi regime was confident in its ability
to
mislead the
inspectors.
69.
Subsequent
intelligence that Saddam Hussein had made clear that
UNMOVIC
was to be
given no grounds for claiming that inspections were being
obstructed
was
interpreted as part of a policy of concealment. The possibility
that it might
have
indicated an intention to co-operate with UNMOVIC appears not to
have
been considered.
70.
Mr Scarlett
wrote to Sir David Manning and other senior officials on 21
November
drawing
their attention to “the first significant […] intelligence we have
received
on the
Iraqi regime’s thinking on how to manage UNMOVIC” since the
adoption of
71.
Mr Scarlett
stated that the key points were:
•
Iraq
intended to demonstrate its ostensible co-operation with UNMOVIC
but
would
actually resume its game playing.
23
Minute
Scarlett to Manning, 21 November 2002, ‘Iraqi Strategy for Dealing
with UNMOVIC’.
304