4.3 | Iraq WMD assessments, October 2002 to March 2003

that Iraq had “only previously admitted to testing VX in aerial munitions, not to any other

weaponisation”.

109. Mr Blair told President Bush on 16 December that the Iraqi declaration was

“patently false”.

110. Mr Blair was “cautiously optimistic” that the inspectors would find proof.

Sir Richard Dearlove was pursuing that.

111. Mr Blair suggested he and President Bush should take stock in January.

112. Mr Blair and President Bush spoke on 16 December.38

113. Mr Blair commented that the Iraqi declaration “was patently false. We now needed

proof that demonstrated it.” He and President Bush discussed the need to put the

burden of truth on Saddam Hussein, how much time he should be allowed and the need

to avoid a loss of momentum.

114. Mr Blair said that military preparations should continue. He did not think that

Saddam Hussein would co-operate. He was “cautiously optimistic that the inspectors

might find proof that the declaration was false. We needed something or someone who

was in some way involved.” Sir Richard Dearlove was pursuing that with Mr Tenet.

115. Mr Blair was “hopeful that this strategy would work; we should take stock in

January if it was”.

116. During his visit to Washington in mid-December, Sir Richard Dearlove

emphasised the need for sufficient evidence to make a convincing case that Iraq

had failed to abide by resolution 1441.

117. During a discussion on 15 December, Sir Richard Dearlove told his interlocutor

that his impression from his meeting with Mr Blair on 11 December was that “HMG

[Her Majesty’s Government] would need clear evidence beyond an audit of the Iraqi

declaration, to commit to military action”.39

118. The report sent to Sir David Manning recorded that Sir Richard had discussed the

Iraq declaration and the need for a “road map” setting out the next steps with a number

of US officials.40

38 Letter Rycroft to McDonald, 16 December 2002, ‘Prime Minister’s Telephone Call with President Bush,

16 December’.

39 SIS record, 16 December 2002.

40 Letter PS/C to Sir David Manning, 18 December 2002, ‘Iraq: C’s Discussions in Washington

16-17 December’ attaching Paper, ‘Iraq: C’s Discussion in Washington 16-17 December’.

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