9.5 |
June 2006 to 27 June 2007
68.
On 13 July, at
the request of the FCO, the JIC assessed Iran’s involvement
and
intentions
in Iraq.53
The JIC
judged:
“Iran has
multiple objectives in Iraq and a number of instruments to pursue
them.
It wants
an Iraq that is unified and stable, led by a Shia government which
is friendly
to Iran and
open to Iranian political and commercial influence. It also wants
the
Multinational
Forces (MNF) to leave, and to make life as difficult as possible
for them
in the
meantime, even if this increases instability.”
69.
The Assessment
stated:
“The
Iranian leadership is encouraging stability through its support for
reconstruction
(it has
negotiated a $1 billion credit line for reconstruction activities)
and for the
political
process … But at the same time they are increasing instability
through
support for
Shia militias.”
70.
The JIC judged
that support to militias meant:
“Iran
continues to provide military technology and training to Iraqi Shia
who it knows
will attack
the MNF: it does not need to give them specific
direction.”
71.
Sir John
Scarlett, Chairman of the JIC between September 2001 and July 2004,
told
the Inquiry
that the JIC’s assessments of Iran’s involvement in Iraq became
“significantly
tougher”
from September 2004 onwards, “reaching a sort of high point in the
summer
72.
Mr Tim
Dowse, Chief of the Assessments Staff between November 2003 and
May
2009, told
the Inquiry that the JIC had “spent a lot of time, from really the
very beginning,
trying to
fathom out what the Iranians were up to”.55
He added,
“I think we started this
whole
period with a reluctance to see an Iranian hand.”
73.
Mr Dowse
did not agree with Mr Blair’s suggestion that Iran was
deliberately trying
to
destabilise Iraq. He told the Inquiry:
“I don’t
think we saw evidence that the Iranians regarded Shia‑led Iraq as a
rival for
support in
the Shia world.”
74.
Mr Dowse
reminded the Inquiry that the Iranians had made quite a
significant
constructive
contribution to reconstructing Iraq and were very concerned about
the
security of
their pilgrims travelling to Iraq: “But at the same time they
absolutely did
not want to
have a western military presence there. So … they saw no
contradiction
particularly
with supporting the JAM.”
53
JIC
Assessment, 13 July 2006, ‘Iran: Intentions in Iraq’.
54
Private
hearing, 10 June 2010, pages 45‑46.
55
Private
hearing, 14 June 2010, pages 60‑64.
15