10.1  |  Reconstruction: March 2003 to June 2004

be brought in to take charge. The US would give up and hand over to the UK if this was

not fixed by February.

Sir Jeremy Greenstock reported on 4 January 2003 that the CPA was making “yet another

fresh start” on its media office.511 Given those changes, there was currently no place for a

senior British secondee.

Mr Blair and President Bush discussed progress on the media on 6 January.512 Dr Rice

had now taken over responsibility for Iraqi media from Secretary Rumsfeld and there was

a bridging strategy to take the media through the next couple of months, while building

up media capacity in Baghdad. Mr Blair regretted the low media profile of Governing

Council members and Ministers, which meant that the public received information through

religious and tribal leaders.

The meeting of the ISOG on the same day concluded that given the US lead in the media

sector there was little scope for UK involvement.513 The US was resisting the secondment

of senior UK staff.

886.  Mr Blair visited Basra to meet Coalition troops and staff in CPA(South) on

4 January. In advance of the visit, CPA(South) advised that:

“News in the South generally good, on security, politics and economy. But no room

for complacency on any of these and much remains to be done if we are to play our

part in securing an effective transition.”514

887.  CPA(South) reported that delays caused by the CPA’s complex contracting

procedures made it harder to “secure the level of visibility” for CPA activity that the

UK and Iraqis wanted. Local expectations were high and the UK, boosted by steadily

increasing numbers of professional staff in CPA(South), would need to work hard to

meet them.

888.  Mr Blair met Ambassador Bremer in Basra.515 Ambassador Bremer said that he

had re-examined economic priorities and intended to focus on job creation and essential

services, in particular electricity. The CPA already planned to deliver 6,000MW of

capacity by June 2004; he wanted to deliver 7,000MW. He confirmed that he would not

liberalise energy prices, monetarise the food ration (polls showed that 90 percent of

the public were opposed) or privatise SOEs, other than some small-scale management

buy‑outs. Those would be hard decisions for the next Government to take.

511  Telegram 2 IraqRep to FCO London, 4 January 2004, ‘Iraq: Strategic Communications Office’.

512  Letter Cannon to Adams, 6 January 2004, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Video-Conference with President

Bush, 6 January’.

513  Letter Cabinet Office [junior official] to Sheinwald, 8 January 2004, ‘Iraq: Senior Officials Group’.

514  Telegram 1 CPA Basra to FCO London, 2 January 2004, ‘Prime Minister’s Visit to Basra: Scenesetter’.

515  Letter Cannon to Owen, 5 January 2004, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Meeting with Bremer, 4 January’.

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