The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
518.
The MOD
reported on 12 August that President Bush had
authorised
preparatory
military activities.
519.
The MOD
continued to warn No.10 against any assumption that the UK
could
take the
lead in the North within the timelines being considered by the
US.
520.
A meeting of
the US National Security Council was held on 5 August to
review
what Vice
President Cheney described as “the latest iteration of the war
plan”.215
521.
Gen Franks
described his strategic objective as regime change and his
operational
objectives
as securing the oilfields and water infrastructure, while
preventing Iraq’s use
of
long‑range missiles and WMD.216
522.
A letter from
Mr Hoon’s Private Office to No.10 on 12 August reported
that
President
Bush had authorised preparatory military activities costing US$1bn
and that
an
inter‑agency process in Washington had been
launched.217
523.
The MOD
reported the emergence of a “hybrid option”, combining elements of
both
the
generated and running start plan. The US could be in a position to
take action in
November
and there was:
“… growing
enthusiasm in the US for action in northern Iraq led by the UK … we
will
need to
guard against US assumptions of UK leading ground operations in
northern
Iraq …
General Franks has indicated his interest in seeing the UK lead
such forces.”
524.
Sir David
Manning wrote alongside the point above: “An idea our own MOD are
v.
keen on;
may be some ventriloquism here”.218
525.
The MOD
advised that the projected timelines for the deployment of a UK
division,
“albeit
with limited sustainment and reach”, bore “no relation to the
timescale of US
plans”. It
might be possible to reduce deployment times if the US provided
support, but
the UK
would need time for preparation.
“It will be
important, therefore, in the coming weeks, to guard against
any
assumption
that the UK will take the lead from the north or could do so on the
basis
of current
US timelines. Apart from the impossibility of making military
commitments
in advance
of political decisions, there are practical constraints, one of
which is
the
potential requirement to provide emergency cover during any fire
strike in the
autumn –
not so far revealed to the US.”
215
Cheney D
& Cheney L. In My Time:
A Personal and Political Memoir. Simon &
Schuster, 2011.
216
Franks T
& McConnell M. American
Soldier. HarperCollins,
2004.
217
Letter
Davies to Wechsberg, 12 August 2002, ‘Iraq: US Contingency
Planning’.
218
Manuscript
comment Manning on Letter Davies to Wechsberg, 12 August 2002,
‘Iraq: US Contingency
Planning’.
254