The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

1325.  At the Iraq Senior Officials Group on 12 January, Mr Howard pointed out that

weekly reporting would be difficult as information was produced by the US on a monthly

basis so little would change from week to week.1225 Monthly reports would therefore be

more sensible.

1326.  On 22 January, Mr Banner wrote to departments thanking them for a series

of papers and asked that the next report on ISF capabilities include more detailed

recommendations on addressing shortfalls and bottlenecks.1226

1327.  On 26 January, Mr Banner provided Mr Blair with a number of updates.1227 He

judged that the Basra update and the ISF capabilities update suggested that “all is not

well with 10th Division, including on equipment (we need to work out how this squares

with CDS’s assurance that all they were lacking is a water truck)”.

1328.  On 24 January, Mr Browne wrote to Mr Blair to update him on the rationale

behind a planned reduction in troops from 7,000 to 4,500‑5,000 (this is also addressed

in Section 9.5).1228 He stated:

“There is no question of us leaving a vacuum in the city, as the IA and IPS are

already doing patrols and we will remain present in the Provincial Joint Co‑ordination

Centre and military transition teams. Early evidence from the final stages of

Op SINBAD, where the IA are in some areas not just in the lead but doing it by

themselves, is that inevitably they enjoy a greater level of consent than we do – but

also that they are doing a decent job. They are far from the finished article but after

re‑posturing our shift towards mentoring and support will ensure they continue to

develop.

“The clear military advice … is that re‑posturing and the associated drawdown will

not adversely affect our capacity to provide support to the Iraqi Security Forces,

including underwriting it by providing a battlegroup size reserve force. We must

recognise that after re‑posturing re‑intervention would not be straightforward but this

is a nettle that must be grasped at some stage.

“We should explain what these 4,500‑5,000 personnel will be doing … The answer is

that as well as holding a battlegroup in reserve … Security Sector Reform will once

again be the main focus – reflected in an increase in our commitment to military and

police training teams. In relation to the Police in particular – an area where I know

the Americans have concerns – we have … done a considerable amount to clean

up the police in Basra, but making it stick now depends mainly on the Iraqi MOI and

Emergency Security Committee acting on outstanding arrest warrants …

1225  Letter Cabinet Office [junior official] to Sheinwald, 12 January 2007, ‘Iraq Senior Officials Group’.

1226  Letter Banner to Siddiq, 22 January 2007, ‘Iraq’.

1227  Minute Banner to Prime Minister, 26 January 2007, ‘Iraq Update, 26 January’.

1228  Letter Browne to Blair, 24 January 2007, ‘Next Steps on Force Levels in Iraq’.

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