3.5 |
Development of UK strategy and options, September to November 2002
–
the
negotiation of resolution 1441
significant
concessions, in the ‘material breach’ area to be had out of the
Americans.
I see our
role tomorrow as being primarily a listening one … But I would like
to see
the
Americans showing more teeth.”
722.
On 25 October,
Mr Straw and Secretary Powell discussed the need to
deal
with views
amongst other P5 members, that the reference to material breach in
OP4
was a
potential trigger for military action.245
They agreed
that the issue needed to be
addressed.
723.
During the
discussion in the Security Council on 25 October Sir
Jeremy
Greenstock
stated that the draft:
“… was a
text about disarmament and nothing else. It was not, and would not
be, a
text that
established a casus belli. The whole point was to make clear that
Iraq had
not
complied, but … we were giving it a last chance to get this right
through peaceful
disarmament.
OP4 did not establish that a false declaration or omission was, on
its
own, a
casus belli. There were no triggers except as set out in OPs 11 and
12, ie
requiring a
second stage of Council business.”246
724.
Discussions
also focused on whether the finding of material breach in OP1
would
be framed
in the past or present tense, and the need to make clear that it
did not
constitute
a trigger for action.
725.
Reporting
informal consultations between Security Council members and
Dr Blix
and
Dr ElBaradei on 28 October, the UK Mission in New York advised
that there was
support for
most provisions in the UK/US draft resolution. Both Dr Blix
and Dr ElBaradei
had
emphasised:
•
the
importance of clear and unified support for inspections from the
Council;
•
UNMOVIC and
the IAEA should choose their staff; and
•
the
modalities for the conduct of interviews should be left to the
inspectors.247
726.
There were
foreseeable practical difficulties with interviews outside Iraq.
Dr Blix
was aware
of the large responsibility placed on UNMOVIC in reporting Iraqi
interference
and failure
to comply. Its reports would have to be accurate. But that would
not mean
war and
peace were in the inspectors’ hands – they would simply report to
the Security
Council,
which would decide on the consequences.
727.
FCO Legal
Advisers continued to warn that the resolution might not
deliver
legal
authority for military action and that the revival of the authority
for the use
245
Telegram
566 FCO London to Washington, 25 October 2002, ‘Iraq: Foreign
Secretary’s Conversation
with US
Secretary of State, 25 October’.
246
Telegram
2050 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 25 October 2002, ‘Iraq:
Informal Consultations
25 October’.
247
Telegram
2057 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 28 October 2002, ‘Iraq: Informal
Consultations with
Blix and
ElBaradei’.
327