3.6 | Development of UK strategy and options, November 2002 to January 2003

749. Sir Jeremy said that he was sure others shared the frustration that Iraq was not

taking the final opportunity. It was “still not too late – but Iraq had to co‑operate now.

If it did not, there was no way the inspectors would be able to fulfil their mandate.”

750. Sir Jeremy asked a series of questions about how, if the difficulties experienced

were a reflection of planned Iraqi resistance, more time would resolve the issues.

He added that the Council:

“… had to realise that it was up against a serious decision under a tight

timescale. More time would not help … [W]e had to stay together in insisting the

non‑compliance had to stop or the Council would no longer be in charge of this

process through inspections …”

751. Sir Jeremy reported that he had hammered home that the Council could not

“simply tread water” and would have to “take tough decisions soon”.

752. Sir David Manning and Sir Richard Dearlove reiterated the UK’s concerns

in talks in Washington on 29 January, including a request to delay military action

until the end of March.

753. Sir David Manning advised Mr Blair that he thought the US accepted that

a second resolution would be needed, but there was no “agreement to wait until

the end of March”.

754. Sir Christopher Meyer advised that President Bush would be “pretty

implacable” and “impatient”, and that he was convinced that the critics

of military action would be routed by an early and easy military victory.

755. Reflecting previous difficulties, Sir David Manning and Sir Christopher

Meyer both advised Mr Blair that he would need to spell out his message to

President Bush in a way which left no scope for “interpretation” in Washington.

756. Sir David Manning spoke to Dr Rice on 27 January about the UK’s need for

Parliamentary support for military action; and that the only way to get that support

would be a second resolution.252 That would need a delay until the end of March.

757. Sir David did not get the response he had wished. He advised Mr Blair that

he would need to speak to President Bush again before their meeting in the US

on 31 January.

252 Minute Manning to Prime Minister, 27 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Conversation with Condi Rice’.

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