3.6 |
Development of UK strategy and options, November 2002 to January
2003
“ie in the
US/UK view, the failure … fully to co‑operate is enough now and
technically
we are
right. 27 January should be crunch time. But we won’t carry other
people …
However, if
Blix carries on reporting non‑co‑operation, makes increasing
demands,
and hardens
his findings with each stage, I think we will carry people – even
without
the
‘smoking gun’ – shortly.”
661.
Mr Blair
stated that military action starting at the end of March/early
April would not
be “a big
military problem”: “But the extra time could be crucial in carrying
international
opinion”
with the US and the UK, provided they had defined clearly the true
role of the
inspections
and Dr Blix was behind the proposal.
662.
Mr Blair’s
proposal was for:
•
a report on
27 January stating that Dr Blix was not satisfied and
identifying
specific
questions for Iraq to address;
•
the US and
UK to set out “the true role” of the inspectors and get
Dr Blix’s
support,
saying that they believed “Iraq is in breach but even so, out
of
deference
to allies, we are prepared to give the inspectors some
time”;
•
Dr Blix
to agree to report every two weeks;
•
the US and
UK to make it clear that, if by the time of the late March report
there
was not a
definitive change of Iraqi attitude, the US and UK would take the
issue
back to the
UN and expect action; and
•
regular
reports from Dr Blix in February and March to build “a clear
pattern
of deceit”.
663.
Mr Blair
argued that the disadvantages of that strategy would be military
delay but
“only,
effectively, for a month”. The advantages would be “huge”,
including:
•
The US and
UK could “build a case based on the Inspectors not just our
own
judgement”.
•
Dr Blix
might find “the smoking gun”.
•
Saddam
“might crack”.
•
There would
be “a far better chance of a second resolution” which would
give
them “a
clear run with public support”.
•
The Saudis
and other Arabs could “build support for their strategy to
push
Saddam
out”.
•
It would
provide time, which Mr Blair believed was needed, “to work up
more
coherent
post‑Saddam and ‘aftermath’ plans”.
•
It would
also provide time “to make a bigger case on WMD and the
link
with terrorism”.
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