The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
“Since …
the end of decisive combat operations, this line has become more
difficult
to defend
as confirmed cases of civilian casualties where UK forces are
involved are
recorded
locally.”
95.
Mr Hoon
replied to Mr Straw the following day, advising that neither
Iraqi ministries
nor
Coalition Forces currently had the capacity to collate definitive
statistics on the
causes of
death or injury to civilians.71
He
nevertheless shared Mr Straw’s desire to be
able to
produce accurate casualty statistics “to be able to refute some of
the more wild
speculation”.
The SIB was investigating 17 civilian fatalities allegedly caused
by UK
forces. The
MOD was “seeking to analyse” incident reports produced since 1 May
2003
in order to
determine the likely number of “additional Iraqi civilian deaths”.
That process
would take
some time; Mr Hoon undertook to write to Mr Straw with
the results.
96.
Mr Price
secured an Adjournment Debate on “military operations and civilian
deaths
in post‑war
Iraq”, which was held in Westminster Hall on 7 January
2004.72
Mr Price
had
previously
tabled 17 Parliamentary Questions on civilian casualties in
post‑war Iraq and
had sent
his paper Can Kill,
Won’t Count to
Mr Hoon and the Attorney General.
97.
Mr Ingram’s
briefing for the debate advised that the review of ASSESSREPs
which
had been
initiated the previous month had been completed. In addition to the
17 civilian
deaths
which were subject to investigation by SIB/RMP, the review had
identified a
further 17
civilians who had been killed by UK forces; one in an (unspecified)
accident
and 16 in
circumstances where force was deemed to have been used in
accordance
with the
UK’s Rules of Engagement.
98.
Opening the
debate, Mr Price asked Mr Ingram how many civilian
casualties had
been
reported by UK forces.73
In his
response, Mr Ingram referred to the 17 deaths
that
were being
investigated by SIB/RMP, but not to the 17 further deaths that the
MOD
review had
identified.
99.
Mr Ingram
rejected the charge that the UK was refusing to keep records of
civilian
casualties:
“That is
not true … Although we record all such incidents, it would be wrong
to claim
that we
have an exhaustive record, because we cannot always be certain of
the
number of
fatalities that result. In some incidents … those who have been
attacking
UK forces
and who have been injured or killed are removed from the scene
…
“There have
also been incidents in which UK forces have been forced to
withdraw
from an
engagement with no reliable means of ascertaining the number of
fatalities
… Finally,
gun battles have taken place in which our forces were not involved,
but
there have
been claims that they were responsible for casualties none the
less.”
71
Letter Hoon
to Straw, 26 November 2003, [untitled].
72
Minute PJHQ
to APS/Minister(AF) [MOD], 23 December 2003, ‘Adjournment Debate on
7 January:
Military
Operations and Civilian Deaths in Post‑War Iraq – Adam
Price’.
73
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 7 January
2004, columns 135WH to 141WH.
188