The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

676. The result of the new strategy set out by President Bush is often referred to in

contemporary documents as the new Baghdad Security Plan.

677. The British Embassy Baghdad reported on 11 January that the new Iraqi-led

Baghdad Security Plan was under way.384 In contrast to previous plans, there was

greater emphasis on reconstruction, with a focus on job creation. Five “mini-PRTs” had

been embedded with troops in Baghdad to assist with reconstruction operations. The

US also planned to inject funds into Iraqi State-owned enterprises to generate rapid job

creation (the Bradley Initiative).

678. The British Embassy Baghdad reported on 26 March that the US had spent

US$1.6bn on 1,678 reconstruction projects as part of the new Baghdad Security Plan.385

679. In parallel with discussions on the new US strategy, the UK Government

considered and rejected Maj Gen Shirreff’s proposal for a military-led Joint Inter-Agency

Task Force in the South.

680. Maj Gen Shirreff wrote to Mr Blair on 29 December to offer, in response to

Mr Blair’s request during his recent visit to Iraq, “some thoughts on how a Joint

Inter‑Agency Task Force would deliver concentrated British effect in SE Iraq and improve

the prospects of achieving strategic success”.386

681. Surveys indicated that Op SINBAD was having a positive effect, but it could do no

more than:

“… create a window of opportunity that must be filled by mass economic effect,

a Rooseveltian New Deal for Basra. Only thus will the militia be defeated. This

requires the mass injection of Iraqi Government funds …”

682. Maj Gen Shirreff proposed that to achieve that:

• the Iraqi Government should establish a reconstruction committee for Basra with

authority and capability to spend central Government money; and

• the coalition should establish an organisation capable of providing the right

advice and planning capability.

683. The current arrangement lacked unity of command and purpose. HQ MND(SE) had

the planning muscle, the energy, the staying power and the unity of command to execute

an overarching plan (such as Op SINBAD), but it lacked expertise on reconstruction. The

384 eGram 1160/07 Baghdad to FCO London, 11 January 2007, ‘Iraq: Reinvigorated Baghdad Security

Plan’.

385 eGram 12261/07 Baghdad to FCO London, 26 March 2007, ‘Iraq: Update on the ‘Economic Surge’’.

386 Letter Shirreff to Blair, 29 December 2006, [untitled].

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