7 |
Conclusions: Pre-conflict strategy and planning
361.
When the US
Administration turned its attention to regime change in Iraq as
part
of the
second phase of the “Global War on Terror”, Mr Blair’s
immediate response was
to seek to
offer a partnership and to work with it to build international
support for the
position
that Iraq was a threat which had to be dealt with.
362.
In
Mr Blair’s view, the decision to stand alongside the US was in
the UK’s
long‑term national
interests. In his speech of 18 March 2003, he argued that
the
handling of
Iraq would:
“…
determine the way in which Britain and the world confront the
central security
threat of
the 21st century, the development of the United Nations, the
relationship
between
Europe and the United States, the relations within the European
Union and
the way in
which the United States engages with the rest of the world. So it
could
hardly be
more important. It will determine the pattern of international
politics for the
next
generation.”
363.
In his memoir
in 2010, Mr Blair wrote:
“I knew in
the final analysis I would be with the US, because it was right
morally and
strategically.
But we should make a last ditch attempt for a peaceful solution.
First
to make the
moral case for removing Saddam … Second, to try one more time
to
reunite the
international community behind a clear base for action in the event
of
364.
Concern about
the consequences, were the UK not to give full support to the
US,
featured
prominently in policy calculations across Whitehall. Mr Hoon,
for example,
sought
advice from Sir Kevin Tebbit, MOD Permanent Under Secretary, on
the
implications
for the alliance of the UK’s approach to Iraq.175
365.
Although there
has historically been a very close relationship between the
British
and
American peoples and a close identity of values between our
democracies, it is an
alliance
founded not on emotion, but on a hard-headed appreciation of mutual
benefit.
The
benefits do not by any means flow only in one
direction.
366.
In his memoir,
Mr Blair wrote:
“… I agreed
with the basic US analysis of Saddam as a threat; I thought he was
a
monster;
and to break the US partnership in such circumstances, when
America’s
key allies
were all rallying round, would in my view, then (and now) have done
major
long-term
damage to that relationship.”
174
Blair
T. A
Journey.
Hutchinson, 2010.
175
Minute
Tebbit to Secretary of State [MOD], 14 January 2003, ‘Iraq:
What If?’
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