13.2 |
Conclusions: Resources
28.
Those meetings
were therefore unable to reach informed judgements on
the
financial
risk associated with those options.
29.
The leading
role played by No.10 in the decision to support US‑led military
action
against
Iraq may have contributed to that omission.
30.
In relation to
decisions of such gravity as invading another sovereign country, it
is
particularly
important that the Prime Minister ensures that the Ministerial
Code is
met.
31.
But
Mr Brown, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, should have ensured
that estimates
of the
likely overall cost of a UK intervention in Iraq, for military and
civilian activities
during the
conflict and post‑conflict period, and the wider implications for
public
expenditure
were identified and available to Ministers and
Cabinet.
32.
The Government
used the existing – separate – arrangements for funding
military
operations
and civilian activities to fund the UK’s involvement in
Iraq.
33.
Military
operations were funded through well‑established procedures which
enabled
the MOD to
incur costs and then reclaim them from the Reserve. Those claims
were
(in line
with the agreed procedures) subject to a relatively light level of
scrutiny by
the Treasury.
34.
DFID and the
FCO funded their activities in Iraq in the first instance by
reprioritising
within
their existing departmental settlements and, if and when that
proved insufficient,
by bidding
to the Treasury for additional funding from the Reserve. Those bids
were
closely
scrutinised by the Treasury.
35.
The Treasury
pressed DFID and the FCO hard to reprioritise within their
existing
departmental
settlements to fund new activities in Iraq, before agreeing to
provide
additional
funding from the Reserve. An FCO official, writing in 2005,
described the
Treasury as
playing “hard ball” and setting departments against one another in
order
to see
off potential and actual claims to the Reserve.6
36.
The MOD, DFID
and the FCO also had access to a small,
inter‑departmental
fund –
initially the Global Conflict Prevention Pool (GCPP) – intended for
conflict
prevention
activities. The GCPP had been established to encourage and support
a more
co‑ordinated
approach across Government.
37.
DFID had a
larger departmental settlement than the FCO, including a
large
allocation
for funding programmes. Programme allocations could be used
flexibly in
response to
emerging priorities. DFID therefore had more scope than the FCO to
find
funding for
new programmes in Iraq.
6
Minute
Crompton to Sawers, 4 May 2005, ‘Iraq: Reflections’.
575