The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

380.  Mr McKane wrote that “we also need to consider the composition of a Ministerial

Group”. He recommended the creation of a separate Ad Hoc Sub-Committee of the

Defence and Overseas Policy Committee (DOP), chaired by the Prime Minister, with the

participation of the Foreign and Defence Secretaries and the Intelligence Chiefs. DOP

“could meet less frequently and be the means of formalising decisions”. Mr McKane also

suggested that Lord Goldsmith, the Attorney General, be invited “to be in attendance at

both these groups, as required” and Mr Robin Cook, the Leader of the House,

“be invited to attend DOP”.

381.  Sir David Manning put the proposals to Mr Blair on 12 September.217 At official

level, Sir David recommended that he or Mr Bowen would chair an inner group, to

include the JIC, FCO, MOD, SIS, Security Service, GCHQ, Home Office and

Sir David Omand, the Cabinet Office Permanent Secretary.

382.  A wider group, chaired by OD Sec, would be “tasked as necessary by the inner

group”.218 The additional members would include DFID, the Metropolitan Police, the

Treasury, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and media specialists from No.10

and the FCO.

383.  In his advice to Mr Blair, Sir David Manning adjusted Mr McKane’s proposal for a

Ministerial Group. He suggested:

“If we follow the Afghan precedent, we would set up an Ad Hoc Group (perhaps

technically a Sub-Committee of DOP under your chairmanship) to include Jack

[Straw], Geoff [Hoon], CDS [Adm Boyce], C [Sir Richard Dearlove] and No.10. The

idea would be to keep it tight with meetings in the Den. If we move to military action,

we would, of course, need to widen this to include John Prescott [the Deputy Prime

Minister], David Blunkett [the Home Secretary] and perhaps others.

“This leaves the question of what to do about the Attorney. I assume that you would

not want him to attend your Ad Hoc Group except by invitation on specific occasions.”

384.  Ms Clare Short, the International Development Secretary, was not on Sir David’s

list of recommended participants.

385.  Mr Blair wrote on Sir David Manning’s advice: “Yes but we can wait before setting

up a key Cabinet Group.”219

386.  Mr Jonathan Powell, Mr Blair’s Chief of Staff, instructed Sir David Manning:

“to progress official groups and leave Minist[eria]l groups for now”.220

387.  Mr Blair’s decision not to establish a Ministerial Group in September 2002,

in the face of advice to the contrary from officials, limited the opportunities for

217  Minute Manning to PM, 12 September 2002, ‘Iraq’.

218  Minute Manning to Prime Minister, 12 September 2002, ‘Iraq’.

219  Manuscript comment [unattributed] on Minute Manning to Prime Minister, 12 September 2002, ‘Iraq’.

220  Manuscript comment Powell on Minute Manning to Prime Minister, 12 September 2002, ‘Iraq’.

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