The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
731.
Other
additions to the previous draft included:
•
The section
on potential UK strategic objectives in the 4 September draft
was
replaced by
draft campaign objectives produced by the Cabinet Office,
which
are
addressed in Section 6.4.
•
As well as
assisting the US to secure Iraq’s oil infrastructure and
production
facilities,
the section on “Potential UK Military Strategic Objectives”
identified
three
additional tasks in the event of conflict:
{{ensuring
that Israel’s security was not threatened by Iraqi
action;
{{ensuring
Iraqi sovereignty post‑conflict; and
{{minimising
damage to Iraqi infrastructure.
•
Draft
objectives for a northern option, which were being considered by
the
Pentagon,
were set out for the first time.
•
The
elements of an information campaign.
•
A statement
that the northern option was “only viable if Turkey can be
delivered”.
There was
“a lack of clarity in the US” about whether that was
“achievable
within
current planning timelines”. The need for “accurate assessments of
likely
success in
delivering key states for the coalition (especially Turkey)” was
one of
the
“conditions” for a “winning concept”. A northern option was seen by
the UK
as
strategically “fundamental” but was not seen as “operationally”
fundamental
by
CENTCOM.
•
A much
expanded section on post‑conflict planning.
•
The
identification of a possible scenario in which Saddam attempted “to
distract
coalition
forces by a deliberate and sustained attack in the North, using
all
methods
available to him (including CBW)”.
•
An updated
analysis of the US plan and whether it constituted a
winning
concept,
including that a division‑size force would be needed for the
North;
but the
tasks still required “more
clarification”. EUCOM
planning was “much
further
behind” than CENTCOM
planning for the South and was “still
constrained” by the
“inability to
properly engage with Turkey”.
•
The UN
route and the timetable for UN inspections might “not be
compatible”
with the US
end state, which was focused primarily on regime change.
That
was
“a potential
fault line in the UK/US relationship”. The UK
might face a
“choice of
following the US or the UN route”.
284