The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
reached a
point where we will achieve diminishing returns if we stay much
longer.
The Iraqis
are in a position to assume the mantle.”
507.
At the
meeting, Dr Reid said that the political and developmental issues
associated
with the
transfer of security responsibility in Muthanna in May had been
resolved.290
508.
DOP(I) agreed
the approach set out in the paper.
509.
Also on 15
February, at the request of the ISOG, the JIC assessed Iraq’s
expected
development
in 2006.291
The JIC
concluded that the new Iraqi Government would be
judged
largely by its ability to deliver security, fuel, electricity, jobs
and a timeline for
MNF
withdrawal, but that there would be little progress on the first
four issues over the
next 12
months. The main obstacles to progress were:
“The
security situation is the greatest immediate obstacle to economic
recovery …
“The new
government will be no more competent or united than its
predecessor, at
least
initially. The new Prime Minister … will have to develop policy
within a more
complex
political landscape … The tendency of new Ministers to replace the
top tier
of
officials with friends, family or tribal members will add to the
difficulties.
“The Iraqi
civil service lacks the ability to deliver at all levels … Although
there are
talented
individuals, institutional capacity was effectively destroyed under
Saddam’s
dictatorship
and in the aftermath of his overthrow: de-Ba’athification, which
removed
many
experienced bureaucrats, has been especially damaging …
Endemic
corruption
is a significant brake on economic development, pervading the
highest
levels of
government, but also reaching into provincial and local
levels.”
510.
The JIC
concluded that:
•
The new
government would come under international pressure to
revitalise
its oil
sector and push ahead with economic reforms (including the
reduction
of domestic
fuel and food subsidies), but would proceed cautiously given
the
potential
for public discontent.
•
The fragile
state of Iraq’s energy infrastructure and continuing
insurgent
and
criminal attacks would preclude any early progress on energy
supplies.
Electricity
production currently met only about 45 percent of
demand.
•
There could
be no “international solution” to improving essential services in
Iraq.
The Iraqi
government needed to adopt a strategy to increase growth and
invest
in services
and infrastructure. Bilateral and multilateral donors could play
a
supporting
role, for example by strengthening the budget process and
providing
technical
advice.
290
Minutes, 15
February 2006, DOP(I) meeting.
291
JIC
Assessment, 15 February 2006, ‘Iraq’s Development: Expectations and
Delivery in 2006’.
280