The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
1314.
Gen Jackson
replied that it was “not unreasonable” at that time to have
forecast
the UK’s
drawdown “to probably a few hundred” but the difficulty was that
the timetable
for Iraq
did not go as planned. He said it was not possible, when the
timetable did go
awry, to
“suddenly put up our hand and say, ‘We can’t do this in
Afghanistan’”, because
it would
have “severely disrupted” the whole NATO effort.
1315.
Gen Jackson
said the fact that the Defence Planning Assumptions “were
not
upheld by
events” and were “almost overturned by events” demonstrated how
difficult it
was to
predict what future capabilities were necessary.689
1316.
The Inquiry
heard evidence about how running two medium scale
operations
concurrently
had an impact on the provision of support helicopters.
1317.
Lt Gen Dutton
told the Inquiry:
“Nobody
wanted to deploy any more troops … or any more helicopters. In
fact,
I can
recall a conversation with DCDS(C) [Lt Gen Rob Fry],
perhaps a slightly
light‑hearted
one which was ‘Don’t, whatever you do, ask for any more
helicopters’.
Of course,
we did end up asking for lots more helicopters and we got some
more
1318.
Lt Gen Dutton
added:
“Given the
circumstances at the time and the helicopters that we had in
the
inventory,
I certainly felt that they [PJHQ] … were doing their best to
provide, if not
more
helicopters and crews, more hours because … that’s just as valuable
if you
can fly the
aircraft for longer and have the spares to allow you to do the
servicing
1319.
The Inquiry
asked Lord Drayson what advice he had received on the ability
of
the UK’s
support helicopter force to support the operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
Lord Drayson
wrote:
“I was
advised that, although the UK’s helicopter force was under
pressure
due to the
decision taken in 2004 under Medium Term Workstrand to
remove
funding,
increased provision of flying hours and the deployment of
additional
aircraft,
the battlefield helicopter requirements in Iraq and Afghanistan
were
being met
(e.g.VCDS minute to SofS 7 Sept [2006] refers.). This however
was
not the
impression I gained following my visits to theatre. Again I found
myself
having to
get senior officers together to try to reach agreement on whether
there
was a
requirement, and if so, what it was. Even when we were in the
process of
strengthening
our helicopter capability in 2006/7 the view of the military was
there
689
Public
hearing, 28 July 2010, page 88.
690
Public
hearing, 12 July 2010, page 31.
691
Public
hearing, 12 July 2010, pages 33–34.
222