The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
[Lt Gen
Reith] immediately – but will close the loop on Saturday [8 March].
In the
meantime
this note is being kept away from Ministers’
offices.”171
519.
General Sir
Mike Jackson, Chief of the General Staff, visited UK forces in
Kuwait
between 6
and 8 March and was involved in Lt Gen Reith’s discussion with Lt
Gen
520.
In his report
to Adm Boyce, Gen Jackson offered two observations on
the
Phase III
plan:
•
that the
UK’s “limited role” was “by no means ideal given the
considerable
capabilities”
inherent within 1 (UK) Div; and
•
“just how
little combat power the US have on the ground” now that 4th
Infantry
Division
could not deploy in time to influence the outcome. “Holding a
little under
one third
of the available coalition armour, 1 (UK) Armoured Division has
combat
power that
may prove decisive for operations around Baghdad.”
521.
Gen Jackson
added that it was for that reason that US forces had “made very
clear
their wish”
to use 7 Armoured Brigade for subsequent tasks. That would be
discussed at
the Chiefs
of Staff meeting that week.
522.
On what might
happen after combat operations, Gen Jackson wrote:
“… I judge
that, realistically, it will be some time before Coalition partners
join US
and British
forces in any real strength, if at all. I draw two conclusions from
this: first,
that as
much as possible of Iraq’s administrative and military structure
should be
preserved;
and second, that we should beware rapid US drawdown on the
American
assumption
that UK (perhaps through the ARRC) will form the focus
for
an
international force that in the event fails to
materialise.
“… GOC 1
Div [Maj Gen Brims] made it clear to me that in clarifying his role
in
Phase IV,
he needed simply to know what his title was, to whom he would
be
responsible,
and how quickly a civil administrator would be appointed. While
he
judges that
Basra has adequate short-term food stocks, it will urgently need
water,
electricity
and medical supplies … Only the ICRC has humanitarian stocks
in
position …
there was little confidence within 1 Div that DFID has a coherent
plan
in place. I
support GOC 1 Div’s intent to manage Phase IV with as light a touch
as
possible,
but it will be important to establish the rule of law quickly – the
question,
as in
Kosovo, will be whose law?”
523.
Gen Jackson
concluded:
“We are
ready not just to demonstrate solidarity with our Coalition
partner, but to
contribute
considerable and potentially decisive combat power to achieve
rapid
171
Minute
MA/CJO to PSO/CDS, 7 March 2003, ‘CJO Visit to Middle East 5-7 Mar
03’.
172
Minute CGS
to CDS, 10 March 2003, ‘CGS Visit to Op TELIC’.
466