The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
142.
Mr Crompton
reported to Mr Straw’s Private Secretary that Lt Gen Kiszely
was
“calm, but
clearly taken aback by the damage he had seen”. The IPU
was:
“… in touch
with DFID to see whether they can assist with the humanitarian
effort,
and are
feeding in some ideas to Kiszely on how best to approach the
reconstruction
task, using
lessons learnt in Kosovo and elsewhere”.
143.
The Annotated
Agenda for the 18 November meeting of the AHMGIR
reported
Lt Gen
Kiszely’s conclusions, and that the Red Cross and Red Crescent were
being
allowed
into the city.80
At least
US$58m had been earmarked for reconstruction. The
IIG
estimated that there were 250,000 Internally Displaced People
(IDPs) from Fallujah,
about 95
percent of whom were staying with family or friends. The Iraqi
Ministry of
Health
reported that there were “no major humanitarian
problems”.
144.
The Annotated
Agenda stated that Prime Minister Allawi had established a
Cabinet
Reconstruction
Committee, whose first tasks would be to co-ordinate
reconstruction
spending in
cities won back from insurgent control and to spend US$200m of
Iraqi
money for
emergency reconstruction in the period up to the elections. DFID
advisers
were
“linked in well” and assisting the Committee.
145.
The Annotated
Agenda also stated that the PCO had declined DFID’s offer
to
“second a
senior reconstruction specialist or more technical help in
Baghdad”.
146.
Gen Walker
told the meeting there had been a slow start to reconstruction
in
Fallujah.81
That was a
failure of the IIG and, in part, non-military US agencies.
There
was no
indication of an immediate humanitarian crisis.
147.
Mr Benn
said that he was prepared to provide Lt Gen Kiszely with a
reconstruction
adviser, if
one was required.
148.
Mr Benn
reported that more generally, security remained a significant
constraint
on reconstruction,
but that DFID programmes were progressing relatively
well.
149.
The AHMGIR
agreed that:
•
DFID and
the FCO should press the UN to deploy a senior,
full-time
development
expert to Baghdad;
•
DFID and
the FCO should keep pressing the PCO for credible
information
on reconstruction
projects;
•
Mr Straw
and Mr Blair should speak to their French counterparts about
the
importance
of agreeing a Paris Club debt deal;
•
Mr Benn
should prepare a note on reconstruction activity in MND(SE)
and
on wider
reconstruction issues; and
•
the FCO and
DFID should prepare a note on why the PCO was proving
slow
to deliver
reconstruction.
80 Annotated
Agenda, 18 November 2004, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation
meeting.
81
Minutes, 18
November 2004, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation
meeting.
220