3.3 | Development of UK strategy and options, April to July 2002

precisely our readiness to participate that would allow you to counsel the President

against proceeding if no convincing plan were to emerge.”

107. Reflecting on the approach the UK should adopt with Secretary Rumsfeld,

Mr Hoon recommended:

“… there would be more mileage in raising practicalities. I would make clear that our

conditions for involvement in military action remain as you have set them out: public

opinion would need to be prepared; the UN inspectors would need to be given every

chance of success; and there would have to be an adequate degree of stability in

the Arab/Israel conflict.”

108. Mr Hoon added:

“Further, by raising in general terms, that our contingency planning has shown

we need plenty of warning in order to be able to contribute to military action

I would reinforce the need for the UK to be exposed fully to US thinking as soon

as possible.”

109. Mr Blair wrote alongside the last point: “No. That will send a wobbly message.”50

110. Mr Blair’s decision on the tactics to be adopted demonstrated he did not

intend to set “conditions” for UK support for the US. He was focusing on the

conditions for success.

111. Mr Blair told Secretary Rumsfeld that the UK would be with the US in any

military action. That would best be done by ensuring a broad coalition and

avoiding unintended consequences.

112. Mr Matthew Rycroft, Mr Blair’s Private Secretary for Foreign Affairs, advised

Mr Blair that Secretary Rumsfeld wanted to ignore the UN inspectors track so Mr Blair

would need to:

“… reiterate the conditions you attach to any UK involvement in any military

operation, including a proper go down the UN route. You also need to press

Rumsfeld to involve us closely in the military planning and warn him that we may

face longer warning times than the US.”51

113. Mr Blair’s response amplified his comment on the minute from Mr Hoon:

“… We should say we’ll be with you. Here’s how to make it happen successfully;

not: here are our conditions for being with you.”52

50 Manuscript comment Blair on Minute Hoon to Prime Minister, 31 May 2002, ‘Iraq’.

51 Minute Rycroft to Prime Minister, 30 May 2002, ‘Don Rumsfeld’.

52 Manuscript comment Blair on Minute Rycroft to Prime Minister, 30 May 2002, ‘Don Rumsfeld’.

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