The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
between the
US and UK Missions to the UN in New York which did not include
any
261.
In a third
conversation, Mr Straw and Secretary Powell again discussed
the timing
and the US
reservations about including an ultimatum.75
262.
Mr Straw
reported that he had argued in favour of inclusion, but it
had
subsequently
occurred to him that it might be possible to table a simple
resolution and
discuss the
merits of an ultimatum with partners. If that attracted a
consensus, it could
be adopted.
That could be less difficult than starting off with an ultimatum
and then
dropping it
from a resolution.
263.
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock advised that the US wanted to keep the
option
of tabling
the resolution immediately after the reports to the Security
Council
on 14 February
to send the message that the US and UK were not going
to
wait around.
264.
Sir Jeremy
also stated that Security Council members would be
very
reluctant
to grant cover for military action within weeks and the draft
resolution
might not
secure nine positive votes.
265.
The FCO
instructions to the UK Permanent Mission to the UN in New York
(UKMIS
New York)
on 11 February set out the questions the UK wanted Dr Blix and
Dr ElBaradei
to address:
“to ensure that the 14 February update … is as uncomfortable as
possible
for the
Iraqis … and ensure the Iraqis cannot avoid the hard
questions.”76
266.
Following
consultations with Ambassador Negroponte on 11 February, Sir
Jeremy
Greenstock
advised that Washington was coming to the conclusion that it might
be
necessary
to table the draft resolution on 14 February to keep a priority
place for the
US/UK
language, provide an alternative to the Franco-German proposals and
create
an “implication
that the US/UK were not going to wait around”.77
267.
Sir Jeremy
reported that Dr Rice’s response to the UK “ultimatum ideas”
had
been “reluctant”.
268.
Sir Jeremy
also reported that, in a conversation between Mr John Howard,
the
Australian
Prime Minister, and Mr Annan, Dr Blix had said “there was
no evidence of
a fundamental
shift in the Iraqi approach, though he ‘detected the possibility of
a shift
in the
future’”. Mr Annan was reported to have:
“… given …
the impression that he accepted the inevitability of military
action at
some point,
but was focused on gaining more time: not for the inspectors,
because
74
Minute
Tanfield to PS/PUS [FCO], 11 February 2003, ‘Iraq Evening Meeting:
Key Points’.
75
Letter
McDonald to Manning, 12 February 2003, ‘Foreign Secretary’s Third
Conversation with
Colin Powell,
11 February’.
76
Telegram 82
FCO London to UKMIS New York, 11 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Blix and
ElBaradei’.
77
Telegram
239 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 12 February 2003,
‘Iraq’.
228