The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
“… try
something on benchmarks, probably building on Blix’s cluster
document”.
That “would
be better done outside the draft resolution” to “avoid diluting
1441
(and avoid
placing too much weight on Blix’s shoulders)”;
•
“… putting
forward a second resolution not authorising force”, although it
was
clear that
Sir Jeremy envisaged there would be an “eventual use of
force”;
•
“… a
peaceful introduction of forces into Iraq for the purposes of
complete
disarmament”.
That would be a “genuine last resort”, which would “cut
across
the
short-term timetable of the Americans and could only be feasible if
there was
a genuine
wish to avoid an international bust-up.” As Saddam Hussein would
be
unlikely to
co-operate, it would be a longer route to military
action.
916.
Commenting
that the talk of vetoes “may be as much to scare us off as
an
indication
of genuine voting intentions”, Sir Jeremy concluded:
“We will
need to:
•
remain
robust that disarmament must be achieved, that there is very
little
time left,
and that we are willing to contemplate military action without
a
further
resolution if necessary;
•
keep up the
lobbying with key swing voters, but also with Russia (…
even
if the
noises right now are negative), so that France increasingly faces
the
prospect of
an isolated veto;
•
work on a
sample ultimatum that could be proposed by Chile or Mexico
…;
•
continue to
reflect internally on whether we would rather:
{{
force a vote
…;
{{
not force a
vote …”
917.
Sir Jeremy
concluded: “So long as we have enough swing votes, the simplest
route
may just be
to force our (slightly amended) resolution to a vote, and test the
French to
veto or
not.”
918.
Mr Ricketts
told Mr Straw that he and Sir David Manning had
discussed
Sir Jeremy’s
telegrams and believed that the “best package” might
comprise:
•
Adding a
deadline to the draft resolution requiring “a bit more time”. A
US
suggestion
“that Iraq should have ‘unconditionally disarmed’ in ten days”
would
be “seen as
unreasonable”.
•
A small
number of carefully chosen benchmarks “set out separately from
the
resolution,
ideally by the Chileans and Mexicans … We could then use
the
clusters
document to illustrate how little compliance there had been
across
the board.”
•
The US to
make clear that it “accepted a significant UN role in
285
Minute
Ricketts to Private Secretary [FCO], 4 March 2003, ‘Iraq: UN
Tactics’.
346