The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
On 21
November, the Chiefs of Staff were briefed that the Iraqi Air Force
would not be
capable of
external air defence until 2013.985
Although
funding was not an issue there
were
difficulties with poor quality personnel, anti‑corruption
mechanisms and bureaucracy
in the
IMOD. To increase the rate of development, the US was planning to
double its
CAFTT team
to 232 personnel. The UK was contributing one Group Captain to the
CAFTT
and had
provided some places on courses in the UK. An earlier request from
MNSTC‑I for
the UK to
provide flying instructors had been turned down as a result of
airworthiness and
safety
concerns. The paper recommended increasing UK support to CAFTT and
providing
an RAF
officer to the Iraqi JHQ.
1066.
On 9 June, the
JIC assessed:
“The new
government will take time to agree critical strategic security
policy. Even
if the
Ministers of Defence and Interior prove capable and non‑partisan,
robust
administrative
capacity in these Ministries will take time to build. We judge
there is
likely to
be only limited progress during the rest of this year in the face
of a virulent
insurgency
and continuing sectarian violence. The need to absorb Shia militias
will
add to the
challenges and could exacerbate sectarian tensions; but a failure
to do
so would
undermine the authority of the government.”986
1067.
Mr Browne
visited Iraq from 18 to 22 June (as described earlier in this
Section).987
His
Assistant Private Secretary recorded that “the main players from a
security
perspective
(Maliki, Boulani (MOI) and Qader (MOD)) all seem determined to
tackle
problems
previously skirted: corruption, militias,
sectarianism”.
1068.
On 25
June, BBC
News reported that
Prime Minister Maliki had announced his
plan for
national reconciliation.988
Some of the
points dealing with SSR were:
•
preventing
human rights violations, reforming prisons and punishing
those
responsible
for acts of torture;
•
measures to
strengthen Iraq’s armed forces so they would be ready to take
over
responsibility
for national security from the MNF;
•
review of
the armed forces to ensure they were being run on “professional
and
patriotic”
principles;
•
ensuring
the political neutrality of Iraq’s armed forces and tackling Iraq’s
militia
groups;
and
•
review of
the de‑Ba’athification Committee to ensure it respected the
law.
985
Minute
ACDS(Ops) to COS, 21 November 2006, ‘Update on UK Engagement with
Iraqi Air Force
(IzAF)’.
986
JIC
Assessment, 9 June 2006, ‘The Iraqi Security Forces: Fit for
Duty?’.
987
Minute
APS/SoS [MOD] to DCDS(C), 28 June 2006, ‘Secretary of State’s Visit
to Iraq –
18‑22 June 2006’.
988
BBC
News, 25 June
2006, Main
points of Iraq’s peace plan.
300