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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
“another one of the very well established sources […] about the determination
of the Iraqi regime to have CBW capable missiles, and the reliance on those
weapons as being a contributor or an important part of the ability to project
power in the region, to establish Iraq as a regional power”; and
“a reliable source”, “about the use of CBW against the Shia population
internally”.132
277.  Mr Miller added:
“So there was a body of reporting by September that was talking not about technical
details of production, but about an understanding that these weapons were
available, and that there was a clear place for them in Iraq’s thinking about how
to conduct itself and how to maintain regional influence.”
278.  Mr Miller concluded:
“As the Assessment said, the intelligence was patchy. It was sporadic. It didn’t flow
through in great volumes routinely, particularly prior to the summer of 2002. But I think
the sense of the community was that yes, we are not getting a full picture, but we
are getting here a pretty consistent picture, even if it is a rather patchy one, sufficient
to inform these judgements, but certainly as additional intelligence came through
in the course of 2002, the sense was that that did then begin to provide a weightier
basis for reaching the conclusions that were set out in September.”133
279.  Asked about the sources, their background and reliability and whether they were
providing hearsay evidence, Mr Miller explained:
“There were different sources. In the Assessment Staff we didn’t seek to have
expertise in the sourcing of the intelligence. So we relied on rather summary
accounts of the sourcing given in the reports, which tended to characterise it as new
or established, reliable or not yet proven, and we give some indication of whether
the reporting was direct or indirect.”
280.  Mr Miller told the Inquiry that reporting which influenced the Assessment came
from six new reports, “from apparently solid sources”.134
281.  Sir John Scarlett stated that “at the time, the separation of the different streams
of reporting wasn’t always clear to the Assessment Staff”, and that:
“… with the slight benefit of hindsight, I can say now that essentially we are
talking about three different streams of reporting … which were coming through
132  Private hearing, 5 June 2010, page 11.
133  Private hearing, 5 June 2010, page 12.
134  Private hearing, 5 June 2010, page 15.
166
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