The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
the
deployment of the ARRC with a brigade of troops “on stand-by
at
high‑readiness”;
or
•
the
simultaneous deployment of both the ARRC and a brigade of
troops.
1094.
The Cabinet
Office observed that the US Administration remained
interested
in securing
the additional UK troops but, in view of the fact that they had
been willing
to give the
UK time to consider the request and had not sought to apply
pressure, a
positive UK
response was judged to be “desirable but not
critical”.
1095.
Sir Nigel
Sheinwald wrote a minute for Mr Blair containing his advice
for the
meeting.624
Sir Nigel
said that the ARRC should not be deployed “if it is just to
alleviate
American
overstretch, since we are under severe pressure too”. He urged
Mr Blair to
“probe CDS
[Gen Walker] who seems to be saying both that it [deployment of the
ARRC]
would be
significant and that the reasons for doing this are political not
military”.
1096.
Both Sir Nigel
and the Cabinet Office highlighted the difficulties inherent
in
almost
doubling UK forces in Iraq (if the ARRC and a brigade were
deployed) whilst
simultaneously
focusing on Iraqiisation and the transfer of
sovereignty.
1097.
The same group
of Ministers and officials who had met on 3 June, plus
Mr Paul
Boateng,
the Chief Secretary to the Treasury, met on 15 June.
Mr Rycroft recorded in a
letter to
Mr Hoon’s Private Secretary that they had concluded that the
UK:
“… should
not close the door to the possibility of sending further UK
troops.
We should
keep the option open until around the time of the NATO
Summit
[28 and
29 June]. But there was no pressing military reason to send
them, nor were
we coming
under much pressure from the US to do so. We should not raise
US
expectations
by talking to them about the details of how the reinforcement
might
1098.
On 16 June,
Sir Nigel Sheinwald sent Dr Rice a Note written by Mr Blair
for
President
Bush.626
Looking
ahead to several weeks containing “international
meetings”
Mr Blair
proposed a strategic plan, the objectives of which included “to
show continued
Iraq
‘grip’” and “to deal with any WMD/intelligence issues” (see Section
4.4).
1099.
Mr Blair
envisaged that the timetable and strategy in relation to Iraq would
include
the IIG
publishing an “action plan on Iraqiisation of Iraq’s security” in
the week before
handover
and an international conference in early September. Mr Blair
wrote that the
problem on
Iraqiisation was “obvious”:
“The
numbers in the police are there. But not the quality or equipment,
e.g. only
7,000 of
the 80,000 police are Academy trained: 62,000 have no training;
only
624
Minute
Sheinwald to Prime Minister, 14 June 2004, ‘Iraq Meeting, 1430
Tuesday’ attaching Paper
Cabinet
Office, 11 June 2004, ‘Iraq: The Context for an Expansion of
Military Forces’.
625
Letter
Rycroft to Baker, 15 June 2004, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Meeting, 15
June’.
626
Letter
Sheinwald to Rice, 16 June 2004, [untitled] attaching Note Blair
[to Bush], [undated], ‘Note’.
388