3.6 |
Development of UK strategy and options, November 2002 to January
2003
56.
Addressing the
issue of “Timetable and Triggers”, Mr Watkins
wrote:
“To some
extent, triggers are now under Saddam’s control and so cannot be
slotted
into any
firm timetable. Moreover, what constitutes a ‘violation’ and/or
‘material
breach’
remains undefined: many in the US are reduced to saying ‘we’ll know
when
we see it’,
which is not a suitable base for planning.”
57.
There was “a
sense in the US” of “two broad timelines in play, implying two
different
plans”. The
first was a “high‑impact event to which the US might feel the need
to
respond
quickly at short notice”. The second was a decision that a material
breach had
occurred
which would be followed by a “more deliberative build‑up to
military action”.
58.
The first
scenario would effectively hand the initiative to Saddam Hussein.
It might
provoke a
rapid response, but that could not be decisive because it could not
involve
sufficient
land forces to take control of Iraq, “unless … it leads … to regime
collapse,
a scenario
in which the US seem to invest quite a lot of hope”.
59.
The second
scenario would give Saddam Hussein time, which he “might
be
able to
exploit diplomatically and militarily”. A deliberate campaign
“would require
some
60‑90 days’ build‑up, and the time will soon come when the
question has to be
confronted
of whether it is sensible to contemplate fighting in the summer”. A
“common
understanding”
needed to be reached with the US and plans “shaped
accordingly”.
60.
The MOD was
concerned that, if a Coalition aircraft was shot down, it would,
“under
long‑standing
plans, trigger a massive US response”, which the US might use to
trigger
a wider
campaign.
61.
Mr Hoon
believed that the UK response should include:
•
pressing
the US to “unblock” the Turkish position (on whether it would
allow
US and
UK forces to transit Turkey);
•
working
“quickly to reach an agreed US/UK view on triggers … well
before
we are
confronted with it in practice”; and
•
explaining
to the US that hostility in the No‑Fly Zones should be met
only
by “self‑defence
responses”.
62.
A copy of the
letter was sent to the Private Offices of Mr Straw, and
Mr Gordon
Brown, the
Chancellor of the Exchequer, and to Mr Desmond Bowen, Deputy
Head
of OD
Sec.
63.
Mr Blair
and Mr Straw, and their most senior officials, were clearly
aware that
difficult
and controversial questions had yet to be resolved in relation
to:
•
what would
constitute a further material breach and how and by whom
that
would be
determined;
15