3.7 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March
2003
1124.
China believed
that a political settlement could still attain the goal of
destroying
Iraq’s WMD.
That would “need resolve and determination and, more
importantly,
patience
and wisdom”. China was “not in favour of a new resolution,
particularly
one authorising
the use of force”. The power of the Security Council was
derived from
all UN
member states and it had “no reason to remain indifferent” to the
calls for “peace
not war”
from the peoples of many countries. The Chinese Government
strongly
appealed
“to the Council to shoulder its responsibility and to do all it can
to avoid war
and to
maintain its efforts to achieve a political
settlement”.
1125.
Mrs Alvear
stated that the reports by Dr Blix and Dr ElBaradei
allowed Chile
“to infer”
that Iraq’s co-operation was “inadequate” and the signs of progress
in specific
areas did
not detract from that conclusion. Chile reaffirmed the need for the
“immediate,
full and
effective disarmament of Iraq” and reiterated its “urgent appeal to
Iraq” to
co‑operate.
Chile supported “a solution in keeping with international law and
with the
purposes
and principles of the United Nations Charter”, which was the only
source of
legitimacy
for the Council’s decisions.
1126.
Chile appealed
to the five Permanent Members of the Council to find a point
of
convergence
and “advocated the continuation of rigorous inspections subject to
a time
limit”. The
use of force under Chapter VII of the Charter could be invoked
“only when
all
peaceful means of disarming Iraq have been exhausted”. Chile
believed a solution
was
possible through a “strengthening of inspections … with clear
deadlines and
concrete demands”.
1127.
Ms Palacio
stated that the Council had “been marking time for 12 years”
and
that the
Council found itself in the “same situation as in 1991”. Saddam
Hussein’s
strategy
remained to deceive. She questioned how much time was necessary to
take
the
strategic decision to collaborate. Saddam Hussein had managed to
divide the
international
community and to reverse the burden of proof. Only maximum
pressure
and the
credible threat of force could make an impression on the Iraqi
regime. Why
should the
international community believe Saddam Hussein’s claims that he
had
destroyed
all his weapons without being able to detect a “genuine will to
disarm”.
1128.
Ms Palacio
stated that the Security Council should send clear messages to
Iraq
about its
determination to achieve complete disarmament and that the Council
should
assume its
responsibilities to respond. A strategy of more inspectors or more
time was
“merely the
strategy of impotence”. It was possible to envisage results with
respect to
nuclear
material and missiles without Iraq’s pro-active collaboration, but
that was “not
true for
chemical or bacteriological weapons”. Spain wanted a peace that was
“safe and
that
ensures that those weapons will not be used by Iraq and that they
will not fall into
the hands
of terrorist groups”.
1129.
In his speech
to the Security Council, Mr Straw stated that everyone agreed
Iraq
must be
fully disarmed and that “Iraq’s failure to co-operate immediately,
unconditionally
383