The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
187.
In response to
a request from Sir Michael Jay, Mr John Williams provided
advice
on a media
strategy for Iraq on 4 September.88
188.
Mr Williams
advised that there was a lot to be done, but it could be done
“with
simple
arguments and plain language”. Mr Blair’s press conference had
shown that
the media
landscape could be changed “in a way that separates the hard core
critics
from the
doubters who are open to persuasion”. The key would be to “put the
burden
of the
argument on to Iraq and on the critics”:
“Detailed
facts will be necessary but not enough.
“We should
make the case with conviction … The tone … should reflect
difficult
choices,
which on balance leave us no alternative but to protect the peace
and
stability
we have come to take for granted … The public … needs to feel it
shares
a sense of
reaching a point where minds have to be made up … In the end, it
will
come down
to an appeal for the public’s trust that the Prime Minister has got
a big
judgement
right in circumstances where there is no easy answer.”
189.
The means of
dealing with Iraq were “not yet decided”.
190.
Mr Williams
set out the elements of a possible argument:
•
The Iraqi
regime was a “uniquely dangerous example” of a threat to
peace.
•
Saddam
Hussein’s record was “a challenge to the whole
international
community”.
•
The “harsh
facts have to be faced, and addressed, whether or not we are
able
to deal
with the threat by asserting the authority of the United Nations,
whether
or not
military force becomes necessary”.
•
The threat
would not go away, it would “become more dangerous”.
•
The events
of 11 September 2001 had shown that distant threats could
not
safely be
ignored.
•
Saddam
Hussein had in the past provided a safe haven for
terrorists.
191.
There was a
“need to stress the general threat Iraq poses to international
peace
and
stability, as well as the direct and specific threat of its WMD
being used against
us”. Mr Williams
also cited Saddam Hussein’s human rights abuses.
192.
Mr Williams
stated that the “evidence dossier” was:
“… unlikely
to be enough by itself to win the argument: it will convince
persuadable
opinion
only if launched in the right environment, framed by a broad case
that
establishes
Iraq as a threat to international peace and security. There is no
‘killer
fact’ in
the dossier which ‘proves’ that Saddam must be taken on now, or
this or that
weapon will
be used against us.
88
Minute
Williams [John] to PS/PUS [FCO], 4 September 2002, ‘Iraq Media
Strategy’.
148