9.2 | 23
May 2003 to June 2004
864.
On 10 April,
Mr Richmond reported that the offer had not been successful
and
action in
Fallujah was being characterised as “collective
punishment”.482
Further
negotiation
between members of the GC and the CPA/US military resulted in a new
plan
for a
cease-fire and subsequent withdrawal of Coalition
Forces.
865.
Mr Richmond’s
assessment of the situation on 10 April said:
“Generals
Abizaid and Sanchez are confident that they can deal with (though
not
eliminate)
the Sunni insurgency currently centred on Fallujah and Ramadi … I
do not
share their
confidence … The military action in Fallujah … has ignited
smouldering
resentment
amongst other Sunnis. Governing Council members are warning us
that
there will
be other ‘Fallujahs’ in towns throughout the Sunni heartland … it
is also
beginning
to undermine the support of otherwise moderate Shia … The
Americans
claim that
their operations in Fallujah are targeted and precise. But to the
outside
they look
like collective punishment. The casualty figures, though not
reliable, tend
to bear
this out … Worse, the current situation is also putting huge
pressure on the
Governing
Council … If the Governing Council collapses (or loses all
credibility) it is
difficult
to see how we can find anyone else to work with us on the formation
of an
Interim
Government to take over from the CPA on 30 June. We will have
no-one to
866.
On 11 April,
Mr Richmond wrote that a GC delegation to Fallujah led
by
Mr Hajem
al Hassani reported some success.484
They had
persuaded leaders
representing
90 percent of the rebel fighters that a complete cease-fire
was necessary
but
reported back to Ambassador Bremer and Mr Richmond that the
city was a:
“… disaster
zone. The humanitarian situation was dire with a reported 518
killed so
far,
including 46 children under the age of 5; 83 children under 15 and
157 women.
1,224
people had been injured and there were problems with water and
electricity
supplies.”
867.
A new
cease-fire was agreed, commencing at 1000 on 11 April. If it held
for six
hours or
more, discussions would begin on withdrawing Coalition Forces and
replacing
them with
the Iraqi Army.
868.
As events
unfolded in Fallujah, in the south of Iraq there was a difference
in view
between the
US and UK military as to how best to deal with the Sadrist
threat.485
869.
Multi-National
Corps – Iraq (MNC-I) orders included a specific request that
UK
forces take
action to close the Offices of the Martyr Sadr (OMS) and the JAM
within
MND(SE);
Maj Gen Stewart declined to comply with this request.
482
Telegram
145 IraqRep to FCO London, 10 April 2004, ‘Iraq: Falluja: Potential
Ceasefire and
Withdrawal’.
483
Paper
Richmond, 10 April 2004, ‘Iraq: an Assessment on 10
April’.
484
Telegram
147 Iraq Rep to FCO London, 11 April 2004, ‘Iraq: Fallujah
Ceasefire Update’.
485
Minute
Stewart to Metz, 11 April 2004, ‘MND(SE) – Sadr
situation’.
347