The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
742.
Lord Goldsmith
also asked to receive copies of the daily reports on
targets
attacked
under delegated authority.
743.
On 20
March, Lord Goldsmith advised Mr Hoon that he would need
to
consider
whether an individual was a legitimate military target and
proportionality
in
considering delegation of authority to attack Iraqi leadership
targets.
744.
On 20 March,
Lord Goldsmith wrote to Mr Hoon with advice about the
points
he should
address in considering whether to delegate authority to target
particular
individuals
in the Iraqi regime.263
The letter
followed a meeting the previous evening
between Mr
Hoon, Lord Goldsmith and Mr Straw.
745.
Lord Goldsmith
referred to his previous advice that Mr Hoon must be
satisfied
that
adequate arrangements were in place to ensure that targets approved
under
the
delegated authority complied with the UK’s obligations under IHL.
The delegation
granted for
the campaign was “extremely wide” and AM Burridge had
“been
granted
authority to authorise attacks which, collectively, could cause
significant
civilian casualties”.
746.
Lord Goldsmith
wrote:
“While I
recognise the need for some delegation, given the likely speed and
extent of
the
campaign, I think it right to note that when we met in Jack
[Straw]’s office in the
House on 4
February I proposed a system under which we could have
personally
approved
more targets identified for the first stage of the campaign. Given
the
degree of
public interest in the IHL aspects of the campaign, you will of
course have
to be
prepared to justify publicly and in Parliament the decision to
delegate authority
to approve
targets in the event of any controversial incidents.”
747.
Lord Goldsmith
set out two issues that Mr Hoon should consider in
deciding
whether to
delegate authority for “individual leadership
targets”.
748.
First, Mr Hoon
must be satisfied that targeting a particular individual was
a
legitimate
military objective under IHL. There were two circumstances in
which
individuals
might be a legitimate target:
•
if they
were a member of the armed forces of Iraq within the meaning
of
Article 43
of the 1st Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions (AP1);
or
•
civilians
“for such time as they take a direct part in the hostilities”
under
Article
5(13) of AP1.
749.
The assessment
of whether an individual fell under either category of being
a
legitimate
target was “a question of fact to be made on the basis of the
actual status,
functions
and activities of the person concerned”. An individual’s
constitutional position
could not
by itself justify the conclusion that he was a member of the Armed
Forces.
263
Letter
Goldsmith to Hoon, 20 March 2003, [untitled].
506