The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
844.
DCC Smith
wrote that “an attempt was made to develop … an
integrated
‘12 month
IPS Development Strategy’ … 12 months being seen … as the likely
duration
of UK
training in Iraq”. The plan acknowledged that the military should
play a key role
in
‘generic’ policing areas such as infrastructure, equipment and
non‑specialist training.
Police
officers would be left to concentrate on enhancing specialist
capability.
In his
update on 12 January, Maj Gen Riley reported that a new
Chief of Police for Basra,
Major
General al‑Saad Hassan, had been appointed by the
MOI.807
A telegram
from Mr Collis on 21 January reported that (now General)
Hassan had
removed a
Badr officer from his post as Head of Police Intelligence, and
whilst allowing
him to
remain Head of Internal Affairs, ordered Internal Affairs to stop
carrying out arrests
or search
operations following a number of suspicious deaths involving the
unit.808
Mr Collis
saw this as “a welcome example” of the new Chief of Police “making
his mark”.
845.
The US began
embedding MNF personnel in Iraqi units in January
2005.809
846.
In his 19
January update, Maj Gen Riley reported on a conference he
had attended
in Baghdad
about the future of the MNF’s mission.810
Referring
to the emphasis on
Military
Assistance Teams (MATs) and Civil Police Assistance Teams
(CPATs),811
he wrote:
“… this is
the direction we have taken in MND(SE). The MNF leadership will
not
impose a
template, but … [allow] local conditions to determine how the
assistance
teams are
to operate. This suits us very well.”
847.
On 21 January,
Mr Phillipson sent a letter to Mr Hoon’s Principal Private
Secretary
about a
meeting between Mr Blair, Mr Hoon and Gen Walker on
Iraq strategy that
morning.812
In
discussing Iraqiisation and delays to the Petraeus Plan,
Gen Walker
referred to
MATs and CPATs as the “latest US plan” but added “this was not the
answer”.
848.
At the Chiefs
of Staff meeting on 2 February, it was observed that there
were
differences
between the UK and US implementation of MATs, but they “were
unlikely to
be an
issue”.813
The CPAT
concept was “not favoured by the UK”. There is no record
of
the
rationale for that view in the minutes.
807
Report
Riley, 12 January 2005, ‘GOC MND(SE) – Southern Iraq Update – 12
January 2005’.
808
Telegram 7,
Basra to FCO London, 21 January 2005, ‘Southern Iraq: Security and
Political Round
Up 13
January’.
809
Letter
Phillipson to Baker, 21 January 2005, ‘Iraq: Future
Strategy’.
810
Report
Riley, 19 January 2005, ‘GOC MND(SE) Southern Iraq Update – 19
January 2005’.
811
‘CPATS’ are
also sometimes referred to as ‘PATS’.
812
Letter
Phillipson to Baker, 21 January 2005, ‘Iraq: Future
Strategy’.
813
Minutes, 2
February 2005, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
248