1.1 | UK
Iraq strategy 1990 to 2000
113.
In OP8, the
Security Council decided that Iraq should “unconditionally accept
the
destruction,
removal, or rendering harmless, under international supervision”,
of all:
•
chemical
and biological weapons;
•
stocks of
agents;
•
related
subsystems and components;
•
research,
development, support and manufacturing facilities;
•
ballistic
missiles with a range greater than 150km; and
•
related
major parts, repair and production facilities.
114.
In OP9, the
Security Council decided that Iraq should submit a declaration
of
locations,
amounts and types of all the items specified in OP8 and to agree to
urgent
on-site
inspection. OP9 also specified:
•
the
formation of a Special Commission to carry out on-site inspections
of Iraq’s
biological,
chemical and missile capabilities; and
•
a
requirement on Iraq to yield possession to the Commission “for
destruction,
removal or
rendering harmless” of all items specified in OP8.
115.
In OP10, the
Security Council decided that Iraq should “unconditionally
undertake
not to use,
develop, construct or acquire any items specified” in OP8 and OP9,
and
requested
the UN Secretary-General “in consultation with the Special
Commission, to
develop a
plan” for future monitoring and verification for the approval of
the Security
Council
“within one hundred and twenty days”.
116.
OP11 invited
Iraq to “reaffirm unconditionally” its obligations under the 1968
Treaty
on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
117.
In OP12, the
Security Council decided that Iraq should:
•
“unconditionally
agree not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons or
nuclear-
weapons-usable
material or any subsystems or components or any
research,
development,
support or manufacturing facilities related to” nuclear
weapons;
•
submit a
declaration of the locations, amounts and types of specified items
to
the UN and
the Director General of the IAEA;
•
yield up
any such items to the IAEA; and
•
accept
inspection and future ongoing monitoring and
verification.
118.
These
requirements were more intrusive than the IAEA’s previous
methodology of
“safeguards
inspections” of declared sites.
119.
OP13 requested
the Director General of the IAEA, “through the
Secretary-General,
with the
assistance and co-operation of the Special Commission”
to:
•
carry out
immediate on-site inspections;
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