12.1 |
Security Sector Reform
1005.
On 18 October,
a meeting was held at the Home Office to discuss the terms
of
reference
for Sir Ronnie Flanagan’s visit to Iraq, attended by
Sir Ronnie, CC Kernaghan
and senior
representatives from the FCO, the MOD and the Home
Office.930
Some of
the
points made
included:
•
the FCO
wanted to understand the progress in MND(SE) and how that could
be
improved
upon, considering how this fitted with work in Baghdad and
London;
•
the MOD
felt that current IPS training could be more efficient;
and
•
“much of
Whitehall [was] not aware of elements that are beyond UK
control.
It would
be helpful if Sir Ronnie could highlight these as part of his
report”.
1006.
CC Kernaghan
circulated the terms of reference on 10 November and
summarised
Sir Ronnie’s task as to “concentrate on assessing the
resourcing and
effectiveness
of the UK’s IPS Security Sector Reform (SSR) programme in
MND(SE)
and its
linkage to the shape and effectiveness of MNF‑I national policing
policy in
Baghdad”.931
There were
12 areas specifically highlighted, including the
effectiveness
of IPS
training, police officer and ArmorGroup contract management, IPAs
and the
relationship
between UK structures and those of the US and Iraq.
1007.
Sir Ronnie
Flanagan visited Iraq between 20 and 24 November 2005 to
conduct
an initial
review of the UK policing effort in Iraq.932
He
submitted an interim report to
Dr Reid
on 13 December, who briefed the DOP(I) on 15 December.
1008.
Sir Ronnie’s
interim report identified:
•
There was
no single strategy for SSR at a national level – he
had
uncovered “references
to at least four”, and “many of these” existed in
isolation of
one another.
•
There was
“a loss of corporacy and a disconnect with MNSTC‑I and
CPATT
in Baghdad”.
•
There had
been insufficient counter‑insurgency preparation.
•
There was
an inadequate focus on intelligence – he referred to US$1m
worth
of
computers for the National Information and Investigation Agency
(NIIA) being
held at
Basra Airport because of “apparently insufficient funds to
transport and
then
assemble it”.
•
Only 5
percent of military activity was currently focused on
SSR.
•
“Within
MND(SE), the biggest issue remain[ed] militia (and criminal)
infiltration
of security
forces”.
930
Minutes, 18
October 2005, ‘Meeting at the Home Office: Tuesday 18 October 2005:
to discuss the
Prime
Minister’s request to HMCIC to visit Iraq’.
931
Email
Kernaghan to Home Office [junior official], 10 November 2005,
‘Flanagan’s TORs’ attaching
Note ‘TORs
for the Assessment by Sir Ronnie Flanagan of the Iraqi Police
Service (IPS)’.
932
Minutes, 16
December 2005, DOP(I) meeting.
285