The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
The
combination of ambiguity and an ongoing process may have convinced
many Iraqi
communities
to support the Constitution, but the failure to resolve some
fundamental
issues
helped to aggravate increasingly sectarian divisions.
75.
February 2004
was the worst month for Coalition casualties since the fall of
Saddam
Hussein’s
regime. More than 200 people, mainly Iraqi citizens, were killed in
suicide
attacks.
Attacks on the Iraqi Security Forces were increasing and concerns
about Islamic
extremists
operating in Iraq began to grow. By the end of March, more than 200
attacks
targeting
Iraqi citizens were being reported each week.
76.
In April,
there was a sudden escalation in attacks by the Jaysh al-Mahdi
(JAM) in
Basra,
described by the General Officer Commanding MND(SE) as “like a
switch had
been
flicked”.21
In
Fallujah, a US offensive which followed the ambush and murder
of
four
security contractors provoked an angry response from the Sunni
community.
77.
The
significant worsening of security, coupled with revelations of
abuse by members
of the US
military of Iraqi detainees held in Abu Ghraib prison, led many of
the Inquiry’s
witnesses
to conclude that the spring of 2004 had been a turning
point.
78.
At the end of
April, Mr Blair’s analysis was that the key issue in Iraq was
not
multi‑faceted,
rather it was “simple: security”.22
79.
Despite the
failing security situation in MND(SE) in spring 2004, Gen Walker
was
explicit
that no additional troops were required for the tasks currently
assigned to
the UK.
80.
The Chiefs of
Staff maintained the view they had originally reached in
November
2003, that
HQ Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) should not be actively
considered
for
deployment to Iraq, even though:
•
Iraq was a
higher priority for the UK than Afghanistan;
•
security in
Iraq was clearly worsening and had been identified by Mr Blair
as
the key
issue; and
•
there had
been a specific US request for deployment of HQ ARRC.
21
Public
hearing Lamb, 9 December 2009, pages 67-68.
22
Letter
Rycroft to Owen, 26 April 2004, ‘Iraq: 15 Reports for the Prime
Minister’.
484