The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
1118.
Sir Nigel also
told the Inquiry that:
“… there
was no sense in the summer of 2004 that we were sort of making
a
decision to
make Afghanistan our main military effort. There’s no record that I
have
seen which
suggests that.”637
1119.
As the
transfer of sovereignty approached, on 23 June the Iraq Policy
Unit
reported to
Mr Straw’s Private Secretary that FCO Legal Advisers had
assessed all CPA
legislation
against the UK’s legal obligations to see what risks
arose.638
1120.
The advice
said that:
“As the
Secretary of State is aware, we have since the beginning of the
Occupation
fought a
series of policy and legal battles with the US over various CPA
initiatives
or pieces
of legislation. These have occurred in some cases over differences
of
approach to
policy, particularly given the US ambitious agenda to lay the
foundations
for
long-term reform of the Iraqi economy and society, and in some
cases because
of an
expansive US approach to the law of Occupation.”
1121.
In relation to
resolution 1483, consultation with the Special Representative to
the
UN
Secretary General had not taken place, although the IPU noted that
no one in the
UN had ever
protested to the CPA or UK.
1122.
The advice
identified three other potential risk areas, two of which raised
potential
incompatibilities
with the UK’s obligations under the European Convention on
Human
Rights and
one of which suggested that the UK might be jointly responsible for
an action
which went
beyond its powers in Iraq.
1123.
Mr Straw’s
Private Secretary wrote a note to Mr Crompton in manuscript to
record
that the
Foreign Secretary had “noted” the advice.
1124.
At Cabinet on
24 June, Mr Blair said that efforts to intimidate people not
to join
the ISF and
to disrupt power and oil supplies were increasingly seen as
contrary
to the
interests of the Iraqi people.639
He told
Cabinet that “this was a crucial
psychological
shift”.
1125.
Mr Hoon
wrote to Secretary Rumsfeld on 25 June, explaining that the UK
had
decided to
deploy the ARRC to Afghanistan rather than Iraq.640
1126.
On 26 June,
Mr Blair sent messages of appreciation to UK staff in the CPA
who
would be
leaving Iraq.641
637
Private
hearing, 3 September 2010, page 35.
638
Minute
Crompton to Private Secretary [FCO], 23 June 2004, ‘Iraq: The
Extent of the UK’s Obligations in
Iraq’
including manuscript comment Private Secretary, 2 July
2004.
639
Cabinet
Conclusions, 24 June 2004.
640
Letter Hoon
to Rumsfeld, 25 June 2004, ‘ARRC Options’.
641
Letter
Blair to Richmond, 26 June 2004, [untitled]; Letter Blair to Segar,
26 June 2004, [untitled]; Letter
Blair to
Nixon, 26 June 2004, [untitled].
392