The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
Council,
which was likely to be at Foreign Minister level.249
There had
been considerable
diplomatic
activity to win the votes of the 10 non-permanent members of the
Council.
He thought
that Spain and Bulgaria would support; and Syria and Germany would
vote
against or
abstain. Angola, Cameroon, Chile, Guinea, Mexico and Pakistan were
being
encouraged
to vote for the resolution. France and Russia would need to “think
through
their
responsibilities”.
811.
Reporting on
his visit to Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar, Mr Hoon said that they
were
supportive
of “our approach”. The Royal Navy Task Force and about half the
total British
military
commitment of 45,000 service men and women was in the region. He
was
“confident
that the troops and their equipment would arrive in place as
planned”.
812.
Mr Hoon
had “one particular concern” which he had discussed with
General
Tommy
Franks, Commander in Chief US Central Command (CENTCOM),
that:
“Not enough
planning had been done on the post-conflict phase of
operations,
including
humanitarian relief. British forces could find themselves in charge
of
a portion
of Iraq quite quickly if resistance to Coalition military action
collapsed.
It would
be helpful if experts from the Department for International
Development
could work
with military planners in the region and consider
pre-positioning
humanitarian
supplies so that there was no hiatus in the event that military
action
took
place.”
813.
Ms Short said
that experts had been involved in talks in the
Pentagon.
Preparations
were “just beginning and needed to be expedited”. A UN legal
mandate
was
“essential” for the humanitarian and reconstruction tasks that lay
ahead. Without
that,
“proper preparation was impossible”. That matter “needed to become
a priority
for the
Coalition”. It would be “difficult” to accommodate action in Iraq
within her
department’s
contingency reserve: “Greater resources were likely to be
needed.”
814.
The points
made in discussion included:
•
The MEPP
needed to be revived quickly. That was the focus of much
Arab
frustration.
•
Unity
inside Europe needed to be restored “as soon as possible
after
any
military action”.
•
Keeping to
the UN route and winning support for a new Security
Council
resolution
would garner support in the UK.
•
In the
event of a veto, gaining a preponderance of votes for a new
resolution
could still
be important.
•
Insufficient
credit had been given to the value of the No-Fly Zones and
the
difference
between life in northern Iraq, which was beyond Saddam
Hussein’s
direct
control, and that elsewhere in Iraq.
249
Cabinet
Conclusions, 27 February 2003.
324